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Sports Broadcasting and the Lawt
ROBERT ALAN GARRrr*
Pmuin R. HocHBERG**
Nearly forty-five years ago, on May 17, 1939, the Columbia and Princeton
baseball teams squared off to battle for fourth place in the Ivy League. The
game would have been as unremarkable as the issue it decided,' but for the
fact that it became the first sports event ever televised in America. By today's
standards, the telecast was of exceptionally poor quality. The celebrated Bill
Stern, who announced the telecast, reportedly "prayed for all the batters to
strike out" because that "was the one thing [he] knew the camera could
record." ' 2 Even less clear than the picture itself was the future that lay ahead
for televised sports. Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., who did The New York Times'
coverage of radio in those days, perhaps best expressed the skeptical view:
[S]eeing baseball by television is too confining . . . .To see the fresh
green of the field as The Mighty Casey advances to the bat, and the dust
fly as he defiantly digs in, is a thrill to the eye that cannot be electrified
and flashed through space .... What would Christy Mathewson, Smokey
t Copyright 1984 Robert Alan Garrett and Philip R. Hochberg. All rights reserved.
* B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, Northwestern University. Mr. Garrett is a partner in the law firm
of Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., which represents Major League Baseball.
** B.A. 1961, Syracuse University; LL.B. 1965, George Washington University; M.A. 1974,
American University. Mr. Hochberg is a partner in the law firm of Baraff, Koerner, Olender
and Hochberg, Washington, D.C., which represents the National Basketball Association, National
Hockey League, North American Soccer League, Major Indoor Soccer League, and College Foot-
ball Association.
The authors have been involved directly in many of the matters which are discussed in the
Article. The views expressed in the Article are those of the authors alone-although they may
have been influenced somewhat by the authors' membership in the Emil Verban Memorial Society,
a group of long-suffering Chicago Cubs fans dedicated to the principles of patience, humility
and everlasting hope, and proud of the fact that their team has not lost a World Series in nearly
forty years. This Article was prepared for the Center for Law and Sports, Indiana University
School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. The research in this Article is current as of April 1, 1984.
1. Diehard Princeton fans may recall that the Tigers won, in extra innings, by the lackluster
score of 2-1.
2. Quoted in W. JoHNsoN, SUPER SPECTAToR AND Tim ELEcTRic L=numsTNS 36 (1971).
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Joe Wood, Home Run Baker, Eddie Collins, Frank Chance, Tris Speaker,
Ty Cobb, Rube Marquard and those old-timers think of such a turn of
affairs-baseball from a sofa! Television is too safe. There is no ducking
the foul ball . . . .
However safe and confining, "sports from a sofa" has now become en-
trenched in the American way of life. Billions of dollars have been invested
with the conviction that people not only will sit at home to watch sports on
television; they will even pay to do so. As a consequence, the economic well-
being of the sports industry has become inextricably intertwined with televi-
sion. In the words of former Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick "[The ad-
vent of television [has] really turned the economics of the game topsy-turvy."I
Often overlooked is the role that the law has played in this process. Quite
simply, there would be no broadcast revenues if the law had not recognized
certain property rights in the accounts and descriptions of sports events; the
size of these revenues is itself a function of the way in which the law has
defined and restricted such property rights. As this Article will illustrate, the
relationship between sports and television has been, and will continue to be,
defined in large measure by a multitude of judicial, legislative and ad-
ministrative pronouncements.'
3. Id. at 39.
4. F. FRICK, GrAms, ASTRSKS AND PEOPLE 110 (1973).
5. This Article is not limited to questions arising under the normal patterns of television
distribution which the sports industry has employed for decades-that is, the sale of rights to
local over-the-air television stations and to conventional broadcast networks. The evolution in
communications technology during the late 1970's and early 1980's has spawned many of the
issues addressed in this article. Some of the forms of distribution used in recent years and examples
of these include-
Nationwide distribution of local television stations through cable television dis-
tant signal importation (e.g., Atlanta Braves on the "superstation" WTBS);
Basic local cable service, pirovided at no additional charge to cable subscribers,
primarily as an inducement to subscribe (e.g., Buffalo Sabres on International Cable);
Basic national cable service, provided at little or no additional charge to cable
subscribers (e.g., the National Hockey League on USA Network);
Per-channel pay cable service with flat rate payment per month (e.g.,
Philadelphia Phillies, Flyers, and 76ers on PRISM);
Per-program pay cable service with separate charge per event (e.g., Leonard-
Hearns fight);
Over-the-air pay television (Subscription Television or STV) package with flat
rate per month requiring special television set attachment (e.g., SportsVision in
Chicago) (see Over-the-Air Subscription Television Operations, 47 C.F.R. §§
73.641-.644 (1982));
Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) with flat rate per month requiring special
antenna (e.g., Phoenix Suns) (see Multipoint Distribution Service, 47 C.F.R. §§
21.900-.908 (1982));
Closed circuit distribution for arenas and theatres (e.g., Portland Trailblazers);
Direct Broadcast Satellite-to-home (DBS), liroviding five program services for
a flat monthly charge, including NCAA events on Entertainment and Sports Pro-
gramming Network (ESPN) (see Docket Report and Order in Gen. Docket No.
-80-603, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982)).
Still other forms of distribution which may be in the offing include: Low Power Television (see
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I. ESTABLISHING THE PROPERTY RIGHT
The law of sports broadcasting had its origin some five years before the
Princeton-Columbia matchup when a Mr. A.E. Newton, who operated radio
station WOCL from the basement of his Jamestown, New York home, decided
to go into the sports broadcasting business. Since 1921, Major League Baseball
had entered into contracts authorizing the broadcast of World Series games
by various radio stations. Newton, however, conceived of a way to broadcast
the 1934 World Series between the Cardinals and Tigers without negotiating
(i.e., paying) for the right to do so. He simply provided his audience with
"running accounts" of the games based upon information that he had receiv-
ed while listening to authorized radio broadcasts.
Newton's "play-by-play" subsequently formed the basis of a challenge to
his license renewal before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The claim was that such conduct violated section 325(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which prohibits one station from rebroadcasting, without
consent, another station's programming.6 The FCC considered Newton's con-
duct to be "inconsistent with fair dealing," "dishonest in nature," "unfair
utilization of the results of another's labor," "deceptive to the public upon
the whole, and contrary to the interests thereof"-but not violative of sec-
tion 325.' Emphasizing that he had confined-his sportscasting career to the
1934 World Series, the Commission renewed Newton's license.'
Report and Order in BC Docket No. 78-253, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (1982), as corrected, 47 Fed.
Reg. 30,495 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts 73, 74, 76 & 78)), and Multi-Channel MDS
(see Report and Order in Gen. Docket No. 80-112, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,873 (1983) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pts 2, 21 & 74)). For an examination of some of these methods of transmission,
see Hochberg, The Four Horsemen Ride Again: Cable Communications and Collegiate Athletics,
5 J.C. & U.L. 43 (1977).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1976) provides in part: "[N]or shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast
the program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority
of the originating station."
7. In re A.E. Newton, 2 F.C.C. 281, 284 (1936).
8. Id. at 285. The FCC dealt with a case similar to Newton's nearly twenty years later when
the New York Yankees, Brooklyn Dodgers, and St. Louis Cardinals challenged the license renewal
of radio station KELP (El Paso, Texas). In re Trinity Broadcasting Corp., 18 F.C.C. 501 (1954).
Station KELP broadcast "recreations" of the games of these clubs, without their consent, based
upon information received from authorized broadcasts. (See infra note 14.) The clubs argued
that KELP's actions involved an unlawful misappropriation of private property rights, as well
as violations of § 303 of the Communications Act (prohibiting "false or deceptive" transmis-
sions) and § 325(a). 18 F.C.C. at 501. The Commission observed that a number of courts had
held conduct such as KELP's to be unlawful. Id. at 503. However, one court in Texas, where
KELP was located, had ruled to the contrary. (See infra note 17.) Noting that there may "well
be difference of opinion with respect to the correctness of the legal doctrine adopted by the
[Texas] court," the FCC nevertheless dismissed the challenge to KELP's license renewal. 18 F.C.C.
at 503.
In a 1953 report the Senate Commerce Committee suggested that the FCC should "take
into consideration" any unauthorized sports broadcasts when deciding whether to renew a sta-
tion's license. S. REP. No. 387, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12 (1953). The Committee further noted
that these broadcasts are typically "inaccurate and misleading," "deceptive of the public" and
19841
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Newton's was the first in a series of reported decisions involving the right
of sports clubs to control the dissemination of the accounts of their games.
The forum, however, soon shifted from the FCC to the state and federal courts,
where the sports clubs were more effective than they had been before the
Commission. Those who sought to follow in Newton's footsteps argued that
the accounts of sports events constituted news in the public domain and that
any person had the right to disseminate the news. The courts took a different
view.
The leading case is Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.9 The
defendant in that case was a Pittsburgh radio station, KQV, which had broad-
cast play-by-play descriptions of the Pirates' baseball games without the con-
sent of the Pirates. The KQV announcers obtained their information about
the games from station employees positioned at vantage points outside the
Pirates' Forbes Field. The Pirates, who had licensed their radio rights to NBC,
sued to enjoin the unauthorized KQV broadcasts.
The 1938 Pirates had the rare distinction of losing the National League
pennant to the Chicago Cubs.'I But they were victorious against station KQV.
The court enjoined KQV's activities, concluding that the ball club "by reason
of its creation of the game, its control of the park, and its restriction of the
dissemination of news therefrom, has a property right in such news, and the
right to control the use thereof 'for a reasonable time following the games.""
The court held that" KQV had misappropriated the property rights of the
Pirates in the "news, reports, descriptions or accounts" of the Pirates' games;
that such misappropriation resulted in KQV's "unjust enrichment" to the detri-
ment of the Pirates; and that KQV's actions constituted "unfair competi-
tion," a "fraud on the public" and a violation of unspecified provisions of
the Communications Act.' 2
A similar result obtained some seventeen years later in National Exhibition
"injurious to the property rights of the baseball clubs and the authorized broadcasters of their
games." Id. at 10. According to the Committee:
The plays which make up baseball games and the sequence of those plays con-
stitute original and unique performances which are of great interest to the public
and of commercial value to the clubs as the creators and exhibitors of the games
and as licensors of rights to broadcast and telecast descriptions and reproductions
of the games. The clubs employ extensive capital, expense and labor in exhibiting
the games and are entitled to protection against misappropriation by others of the
fruits of the clubs' efforts. Your committee understands that these property rights
are supported by well-established principles of law, including principles of com-
mon law copyright and the principles of equitable protection against unfair
competition.
Id. at 11.
9. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
10. Only once in the succeeding forty-five years could any team say it lost the pennant to
the Cubs.
It might be noted that the Cubs went on to lose four straight to the Yankees in the 1938
World Series. As Jim Enright observes in his book The Chicago Cubs: "One miracle was all
they had in them in 1938."
11. 24 F. Supp. at 492.
12. Id. at 494.
[Vol. 59:155
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Co. v. Fass.'3 The defendant in that case, an "independent newsgatherer"
named Martin Fass, listened to authorized radio and television broadcasts of
the 1953 and 1954 New York Giants. Without securing the Giants' consent,
Fass simultaneously teletyped reports of their games to radio stations across
the country for immediate rebroadcast.' 4 The Giants made it to the World
Series in 1954; Fass did not. Some three months before Willie Mays turned
his back on the celebrated Vic Wertz fly ball, the court enjoined Fass' activities
and awarded the Giants damages, concluding:
Plaintiff is the owner of the professional baseball exhibitions which it pro-
duces; and its property rights, as owner of such exhibitions, include the
proprietary right to sell to others, who desire to purchase and to whom
plaintiff desires to sell, licenses or rights under which the purchasers are
authorized to [broadcast the games] in such geographical area or areas
as may be agreed upon between plaintiff and such purchasers ...
... In creating the games, the competing clubs not only create an
exhibition for the spectators at the game but also create, as the game un-
folds, a drama consisting of the sequence of plays, which is valuable pro-
gram material for radio and television stations and for which licensees
have paid and are paying plaintiff substantial sums."
Other courts likewise have protected the sports clubs' property rights in
the accounts and descriptions of their games, and have prevented the
unauthorized exploitation of these rights. ' 6 There appear to be only two cases
13. 133 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct.) (preliminary injunction), aff'd without opinion, 136 N.Y.S.2d
358 (App. Div. 1954), 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (final judgment).
14. These stations presented what had been known as "recreations," perhaps the most celebrated
of which were those done by Gordon McLendon:
Saving the expense of pickups from baseball parks, entrepreneur Gordon McLendon
staged hair-raising play-by-play descriptions in a Dallas studio from information
on a news-agency ticker while an engineer, like an organist selecting stops, faded
sound-effects records in and out: quiet crowds, restless crowds, hysterical crowds.
His selections stimulated the announcer, who invented reasons for any sudden crowd
excitement: a fan had made an unbelievable one-hand catch of a foul, or a peanut
vender had fallen downstairs. McLendon was scholarly too: he had tape recordings
of "The Star-Spangled Banner" as played at each biall park. The McLendon broad-
casts were often more exciting than the ball games.
2 E. BARNouw, THE GoLDEN WEn: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN TM UNITED STATES 289 (1968).
15. 143 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
16. E.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d
845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (owner of New York Rangers stated a cause of action against defendants
who had incorporated film of the Rangers' hockey game in a motion picture; defendants had
been authorized to use the film in newsreels only); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak
Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941) (defendant enjoined from retransmitting to paying
customers plaintiff's broadcasts of the 1941 World Series); Twentieth Century Sporting Club,
Inc. v. Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (1937) (defendant enjoined
from supplying radio station with "up to the minute" "ringside descriptions" of the Louis-Farr
fight in Yankee Stadium); Southwestern Broadcasting Co. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co., 210
S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (defendant enjoined from broadcasting high school football
games, the broadcast rights to which had been licensed to the plaintiff). See also Johnson-Kennedy
Radio Corp. v. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., 97 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1938) (radio station
enjoined from broadcasting a professional football game, the rights to which had previously
been granted to another station); Liberty Broadcasting Sys. v. National League Club of Boston,
Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,278 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (concluding that each baseball club has
1984]
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in which courts refused to do so'7 -although it is unlikely that either of these
decisions would be followed today.' 8
The sports property right concept was strengthened by the Supreme Court
in Zacchini v. Scripps-Ho ward Broadcasting Co.' 9 There, an Ohio television
station broadcast a fifteen-second tape of the celebrated "Flying" Zacchini's
"human cannonball" performance without obtaining his consent. In response
to Zacchini's claim that the station had unlawfully misappropriated his pro-
fessional property, the station responded that its broadcast was protected free
speech. A five to four majority of the United States Supreme Court sided
with the Flying Zacchini. Citing the Pittsburgh Athletic decision and other
authority, the Court concluded:
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media
reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when
they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. The Con-
stitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compen-
sate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege
respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without
liability to the copyright owner.., a prize fight.., or a baseball game,
where the promoters or the participants had other plans for publicizing
the event.2
a property right in its games and the "news, reports, descriptions and accounts thereof," and
the "sole right" to disseminate these accounts).
17. Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); National Exhibition Co. v.
Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
18. The court in Pittsburgh Athletic specifically rejected the Teleflash decision, characterizing
it as an "incorrect" interpretation of the law. 24 F. Supp. at 493. Moreover, on several subse-
quent occasions, the New York state courts rendered decisions at odds with Teleflash. See authority
cited supra note 16. The decision in Loeb v. Turner appears to be inconsistent with a sister
court's decision in Southwestern Broadcasting Co. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co., 210 S.W.2d 230,
which was not even mentioned in Loeb v. Turner.
In any event, the courts in Teleflash and Loeb v. Turner suggest that one could prevent per-
sons located within the stadium from disseminating accounts of the sports event by conditioning
admittance on this ground. See 24 F. Supp. at 488-89; 257 S.W.2d at 802. Many tickets and
Working Press Passes have such a condition:
This pass is issued subject to the condition and by use of this pass each person
admitted hereunder agrees that he will not transmit or aid in transmitting any report,
description, account or reproduction of the baseball game, except . . . to the
newspaper or press association represented by him ....
1983 Baltimore Orioles Working Press Pass.
This working credential is issued to an organization for the sole purpose of pro-
viding stadium access to an accredited individual who has a legitimate working
function (media or game service) in connection with this game. It is non-transferable.
Any unauthorized use of this credential subjects the bearer to ejection from the
stadium and prosecution for criminal trespass.
1983 Washington Redskin Working Press Credentials Conditions.
19. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See generally Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amend-
ment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TULANE L. Rzv. 836 (1983).
20. 433 U.S. at 574-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Post Newsweek Stations-
Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1981), where the court ruled that
a television station does not have "a constitutional right of special access" to a skating competi-
tion being held in a civic arena. The court upheld the defendants' right to deny access to the
station unless the station agreed not to broadcast footage of the event before the ABC television
[Vol. 59:155
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Congress added a new dimension to the sports property right concept when
it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976.21 At the urging of the professional sports
leagues, 2  Congress extended federal copyright protection to live sports broad-
casts, thereby vesting the owners of these telecasts with the exclusive right
to "perform" them "publicly. ' 23 To be eligible for copyright protection, the
broadcast must be "fixed" (i.e., recorded) simultaneously with its
transmission. 24 The remedies afforded by the Copyright Act are particularly
valuable because they permit the copyright owner to recover statutory damages
of between $250 and $50,000 for each act of infringement without regard
to actual damages suffered.2 5
network (to whom defendants had licensed the television rights) concluded its coverage. The
court noted:
It is clear that the [International Skating Union] has a legitimate commercial
stake in this event, and they, like Zacchini, are entitled to contract regarding the
distribution of this entertainment product.... It is established ... that the press
has no constitutional right of special access to an event such as these skating
championships.
... [T]he entertainment here is the exposition of an athletic exercise. As such,
it is on the periphery of protected speech (for purposes of a balancing of conflict-
ing interests), as opposed, for example, to political speech, which is at the core
of first amendment protection.
510 F. Supp. at 84-85, 86.
A similar case arose again in mid-1982, when Home Box Office and ABC had contracted
to show delayed the Holmes-Cooney heavyweight championship fight in its entirety, but NBC
News showed excerpts taken from the pay-television transmission. See infra note 112.
See also USA Today, Feb. 17, 1984, at 1-D (ABC, the purchaser of broadcast rights to the
1984 Winter Olympics, complained about NBC's unauthorized broadcqst of highlights of an
award ceremony and threatened to bar NBC from access to certain highlight film).
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. V 1982).
22. The sports leagues originally sought federal copyright protection as a means of controlling
the unauthorized retransmission of their broadcasts by cable television systems. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1965); Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 1825-26, 1842-43,
1848 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings]; Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (statement of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (Supp. V 1982).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659, 5665-67 [hereinafter cited as H.R. RaP. No. 94-1476]. See 43 Fed. Reg. 40,225
(1978) (Copyright Royalty Tribunal noted that the baseball recording procedures are "suitable"
to "establish proof of fixation.").
Once fixed, the live sports telecast qualifies for copyright protection as a "motion picture"
which is a form of "audiovisual works." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definitions of "motion picture"
and "audiovisual works"); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (including "motion pictures and other audiovisual
works" among the forms of copyrightable subject matter); 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2Xii) & 202.21(g)
(1983) (Copyright Office regulation concerning registration of copyrighted "television transmis-
sion programs").
It has been noted that many sports fans will be shocked to learn that since 1976 virtually
every televised sports event has been "fixed." See Hochberg, Second and Goal to Go: The
Legislative Attack in the 92d Congress on Sports Broadcasting Practices, 18 N.Y.L.F. 841, 863
n.97 (1973).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. V 1982). Such damages, however, may not be available unless
the sports club complies with the notice and registration provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1982).
1984]
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II. IDENTIFYING THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT
Given the increasingly valuable nature of the property right which the sports
clubs established in the accounts and descriptions of their games, it is not
surprising that two other groups-broadcasters and players-have argued that
they also are beneficiaries of this right. A somewhat related question, that
has become important to colleges in particular, is which of the two teams
involved in a game owns the rights to disseminate the accounts and descrip-
tions of that game.
A. The Broadcasters' Claims
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 is replete with instances
where the sports clubs assumed they would own the copyright that they urged
Congress to create. 26 Not once during the decade-long debates did the broad-
casters assert anything to the contrary; on occasion, they even testified that
the clubs would be the copyright holders.17 Nevertheless, when it came time
to claim a share of the royalties paid by cable systems for retransmitting
copyrighted television programming, 28 the broadcasters' principal trade
association-the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)-argued that
broadcasters have a copyrightable interest in sports telecasts which they produce,
and that this interest entitles them to a share of royalties.
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, the federal agency responsible for allocating
the cable royalties among copyright owners, rejected the NAB's claims in the
1978 royalty distribution proceeding (the first such proceeding under the
Copyright Act of 01976). Relying primarily on the legislative history of the
Act, the Tribunal concluded that the sports clubs are the copyright owners
of the telecasts of their games and are entitled to all of the cable royalties
See 17 U.S.C. § 412; Pacific & S., Inc. v. Duncan, No. C81-1106 (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 13,
1983), discussed infra note 111.
26. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 526-32 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1973 Senate Hearings] (testimony of James B. Higgins, representing the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association); id. at 533-36, 539-47 (testimony and statement of Bowie K. Kuhn,
Commissioner of Baseball); id. at 550-51 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of the National
Football League); id. at 551-52 (statement of J. Walter Kennedy, Commissioner of the National
Basketball Association); Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 785-810 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings] (testimony and statement of Bowie
K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball); id. at 810-17 (testimony and statement of Philip R. Hochberg,
representing the National Hockey League); id. at 817-25 (testimony and statement of John 0.
Coppedge, representing the National Collegiate Athletic Association).
27. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 785 (testimony of John Summers of the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)); id. at 1377 (testimony of Vincent Wasilewski of
the NAB); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 1244 (testimony of Ernest Jennes, counsel
for the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters).
28. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:155
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attributable to these telecasts-unless the broadcaster and club have a con-
tractual agreement "specifically" to the contrary.29 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not find the legislative
history to be quite so dispositive of the question. Nevertheless it affirmed
the Tribunal's decision to award to the sports interests all of the 1978 royalties
for sports programming.30
The Copyright Act provides that cable royalties may be awarded only to
copyright owners." Thus, the court's decision to affirm the Tribunal's sports
award leaves no doubt that the sports clubs are copyright owners of the telecasts
of their games. The decision, however, suggests that the broadcasters also
may have a copyrightable interest in sports telecasts which they produce,
32
and that the mission of the Tribunal is to evaluate the broadcasters' interest
in these telecasts vis-a-vis that of the sports clubs.
In the appeal of the 1978 cable royalty proceeding the court observed that
the broadcasters' interest was "quantitatively de minimis";33 thus, it upheld
the Tribunal's decision not to award any sports royalties to the broadcasters.
In the subsequent appeal of the 1979 proceeding, however, the court deter-
mined that the valuation issue was one to be decided on the basis of the par-
ticular record before the Tribunal. Because the NAB had introduced new
evidence in the 1979 proceeding on broadcasters' contributions to sports
telecasts and because the Tribunal had not evaluated this evidence, the court
remanded the sports award to the Tribunal for such an evaluation. The court
did make it clear, however, that the Tribunal need not award the broadcasters
any royalties whatsoever for their contributions to sports telecasts.
34
Before the court of appeals had ruled in the 1979 case, the Tribunal, in
the 1980 cable royalty proceeding, appeared to make the very record evalua-
29. 1978 Cable Royalty Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026, 63,034-35 (1980). The broad-
casters did not present any such contracts to the Tribunal.
30. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 377-79
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4) (Supp. V 1982).
32. According to the court, "Congress clearly seemed to contemplate Tribunal recognition
of the copyrightable interests claimed by NAB." 675 F.2d at 378. Referring to the "banter of
Howard Cosell and Don Meredith," the court also adopted the perhaps not universally-shared
conclusion that: "Anyone who has ever watched ABC's Monday Night Football . . . knows
that the commentary of the announcers and such effects as instant replay in slow motion add
immensely to the quality of a sports telecast." Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
33. The court noted:
That the interests advanced by NAB are copyrightable does not get broadcasters
to the promised land .... The Tribunal still must address the value of these in-
terests .... By any standard ... the theories advanced by NAB concern interests
that are quantitatively de minimis. As the Tribunal observes, the work of television
stations in broadcasting sports events and compiling broadcast days has minimal
market value because "the public tunes in sports broadcasts mainly to see the sports
performance, not the activities of the director and the cameramen."
Id. at 379 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
34. See Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295,
1304 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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tion subsequently ordered by the court. The Tribunal concluded that the broad-
casters' contributions are, indeed, de minimis and do not warrant any in-
crease in the broadcasters' royalty award:
mhe contribution of the broadcaster as compared with that of the teams
is minimal ....
We find no evidence in our record, including that of the NAB sports
witnesses, establishing that the contribution of the broadcaster in any signifi-
cant respect contributes to a cable operator's interest in sports programming,
or the decision of an individual to subscribe to cable television.
... Proceeding from the broadcaster use of ratings to judge the value
of programs, [a witness for the sports interests] testified that the factors
that affect the ratings all relate to the sports teams, and that the quality
of the production does not affect the ratings. We concur in this testimony.
We do not find it creditable that a cable subscriber would pass up viewing
a game involving teams competing for the pennant to watch a Chicago
Cubs game because of the quality of the production of the Cubs telecast.I
Although the Tribunal may have underestimated the loyalty of Cubs fans who
typically are quite interested in watching their team lose, its observations other-
wise appear to be accurate.3 6
The broadcasters and sports interests ultimately resolved their differences
before the Tribunal. The settlement provides that the sports interests will con-
tinue to receive all of the royalties attributable to sports telecasts; individual
broadcasters can seek to enter into negotiations with their clubs as to how,
if at all, these royalties might be shared. In adopting the settlement agree-
ment, the Tribunal noted:
As we and the Court of Appeals have previously recognized, it is clear
that a sports club owns a copyright in the telecasts of its games if
simultaneously "fixed;" it is equaly [sic] clear that a broadcaster who pro-
duces the telecasts of such games also owns a copyright in such telecasts.
35. 1980 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,552, 9,565-66 (1983) (em-
phasis added). On motion of the Tribunal, the order in the 1980 case subsequently was so vacated
and remanded to the Tribunal in light of the court's decision in the 1979 case. The remand
proceeding is now pending before the Tribunal.
36. It is perhaps instructive to note that a trade association-the NAB-was the one to raise
the sports issue before the Tribunal. Individual broadcasters have typically recognized in con-
tractual agreement that the clubs own the copyright in the telecasts of their games, and that
they (the clubs) are entitled to the cable royalties. For example, in the 1980 royalty distribution
proceeding, Major League Baseball presented a survey showing that of the 15 Baseball contracts
which specifically addressed the issue for the 1980 season, all provided that the club is the copyright
owner; four other clubs had contracts covering subsequent seasons which specifically provided
that the club is the copyright owner; of the seven remaining clubs, two produced their own telecasts
and two were commonly owned with their flagship stations (thus, in these instances there was
no controversy over the royalty distribution). Sports Ex. No. 44 in CRT Docket No. 81-1 (on
file with authors). Typical contractual language is:
It is hereby recognized that the club, as the original owner of the copyright to
each telecast made pursuant to this Agreement, possesses all rights afforded the
copyright owner by the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Public Law 94-553, with
respect to these telecasts, including without limitation, the rights to receive royalties
distributed pursuant to Section 111 of the Act and to sue for infringement under
Chapter 5 of the Act.
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These copyrightable interests have relative market values, the determina-
tion of which may be addressed in any royalty distribution proceedings.
By adopting the approach of [the broadcasters and sports interests], it
is not necessary that we make such a valuation; rather, we are simply
allowing the parties themselves to do so in the context of their private
negotiations."
B. The Players' Claims
In May 1982 the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) sent
a form letter to a number of the television stations, national television net-
works and cable networks broadcasting professional baseball games. The
MLBPA claimed that the players possess property rights in the televised per-
formances of baseball games; that there can be no broadcast of these perfor-
mances without the players' consent; and that the Major League Baseball clubs,
the leagues and the Commissioner of Baseball have no authority to grant such
consent-although they have been doing so for nearly forty years.
38
The response of the Major League Baseball clubs has been to seek a
declaratory judgment that the players have no rights to broadcast revenues.
In Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 3 the clubs
have sought a ruling that they, as the employers of the players, possess all
rights in the telecasts of their games based upon (1) the "works made for
hire" doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act;," (2) the common law master-servant
doctrine; (3) the Uniform Player's Contract;4 and (4) the doctrines of waiver
37. 1979 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding, 49 Fed. Reg. 3,899 (1984).
38. The nature of the players' theory is discussed in Quinn & Warren, Professional Team
Sports New Legal Arena: Television and the Player's Right of Publicity, 16 IND. L. REv. 487 (1983).
The issue whether players are entitled, as a matter of law, to a share of broadcast revenues
was raised in a 1979 lawsuit filed by a number of National Basketball Association players against
a New York City cable system which cablecast NBA games. That lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed.
See Silas v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 79 Civ. 3025 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 8, 1979).
In their April 18, 1983 "Memorandum of Understanding" the NBA and the National Basketball
Players Association agreed to disagree as to the inherent rights of the players. Nevertheless, they
did conclude that the NBA and its teams would possess all the necessary rights at least during
the term of the agreement (which expires at the conclusion of the 1986-87 season). Compare
Chavez v. Hollywood Post No. 43, 16 U.S.L.W. 2362 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948) (promoter owns
television rights unless prizefighters expressly reserve such rights by contract).
39. No. 82 C 3710 (N.D. Ill. filed June 14, 1982). The suit was brought by all twenty-six
Major League Baseball clubs. Two weeks later three players filed a counter-lawsuit, raising the
same issue. Rogers v. Kuhn, No. 82 Civ. 4310 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1982). This case has been
transferred to the Northern District of Illinois and consolidated with the Baltimore Orioles litiga-
tion. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in late 1983.
40. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,201(b) (Supp. V 1982); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 24, at 121.
This doctrine provides, in essence, that an employee's contribution to a copyrighted work becomes
the property of the employer. See generally Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under
S.22, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Ray. 209 (1976).
41. Paragraph 3(c) of the Uniform Player's Contract provides:
The player agrees that his picture may be taken for still photographs, motion pic-
tures or television at such time as the Club may designate and agrees that all rights
in such pictures shall belong to the Club, and may be used by the Club for publicity
purposes in any manner it desires.
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and estoppel and implied and express consent. " A judicial decision upholding
the clubs' position on any one of these theories would remove the controversy
from the courts but not from the negotiating table; the issue of whether players
may receive a direct share of the increasingly important broadcast revenues
(over and above their current salaries) surely will surface during collective
bargaining sessions.
C. Inter-Club Claims
Sports clubs have confronted challenges not only from broadcasters and
players, but from other clubs as well. Because a game cannot be played without
two teams, the question has arisen: Which team owns the right to distribute
the accounts and descriptions of that game? 3 Typically, this question is re-
solved by agreement.
One rather interesting case, where no contractual resolution had been
reached, was Wichita State University Intercollegiate Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v.
Swanson Broadcasting Co.4 This case involved a radio station in Wichita,
Kansas, which had contracted with opponents of the Wichita State University
(WSU) football and basketball teams to broadcast WSU's away games (that
is, the opponents' home games). WSU, which itself had entered into a broad-
casting contract with another Wichita radio station, sought to enjoin the other
broadcasts in its home city of Wichita. It relied upon common law principles
of misappropriation and contractual interference. The court granted a
preliminary injunction, concluding:
Wichita State University has the right to broadcast the sports events into
their home territory, be it a "home game" or "away game." They do
not have the right to make a determination who will broadcast that game
to New York, Los Angeles, or Moose Jaw, Montana, but they do have
a right to make a determination as to who they will contract with to broad-
cast that game into the Wichita area. It is an exclusive right and it is a
right exclusive even of the opponent of Wichita State University; they can-
not make that determination.4'
42. Compare National Football League v. The Alley, Inc., No. 83-0701 CIV-JWK (S.D. Fla.
filed Mar. 25, 1983), Transcript of Bench Ruling at 3 (Nov. 22, 1983) ("The players and coaches
consented to participate in the [National Football League] game and they waived their rights
they may have had under [the Florida right of publicity statute] with respect to the public use
of their game"). See also id., Order Containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at
Finding 17 and Conclusion 9 (Dec. 29, 1983).
43. For example, assume that the University of Pittsburgh is playing at the University of
Maryland in an important Eastern game. Pitt's licensee for delayed broadcast in Pittsburgh decides
to sell its tape for a delayed cablecast to USA Network without Maryland's permission. Can
Maryland stop the USA showing? Suppose Maryland already had sold rights to ESPN?
44. Case No. 81 C 130 (Sedgwick Cty., Kan. Dist. Ct.).
45. Transcript of Bench Ruling at 5 (January 23, 1981). But see Kelly Communications Corp.
v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Corp., Case No. 83-377 Civil (Sup. Judicial Ct. for Suffolk Cty.,
Mass.). After Kelly had purchased the rights to Boston College football and sold them to one
Boston radio station, Westinghouse's Boston station joined the Penn State radio network for
a single game, Penn State at Boston College. In a bench ruling the day before the game, the
appeals court dissolved a preliminary injunction which would have prevented Westinghouse from
presenting the broadcast. Language in the Pittsburgh Athletic decision, discussed supra notes
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The same issue arose in a case involving Michigan State University. 46 The
plaintiff in that case, Gross Telecasting, had been unsuccessful in its attempts
to negotiate television rights with Michigan State. Consequently, it sought
to purchase the rights to Spartan away basketball games from other Big Ten
schools. Gross was able to obtain the rights for games played at Michigan,
Minnesota and Iowa, but not for those played at Ohio State, Illinois, Indiana
and Purdue, allegedly because Michigan State coerced those schools into not
granting contracts. Gross sued on a number of grounds, including antitrust
and first amendment issues and state law business tort claims. In mid-1983,
it was agreed that "[d]efendants would bring an appropriate motion so as
to bring before the court the issue of whether defendant Michigan State Univer-
sity had a legally cognizable property right or interest in away game telecasts
of its Big Ten basketball games." 7 The case was dismissed with prejudice,
however, before the motion was ever filed.
III. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, sports clubs have a property right
in the accounts and descriptions of their games. Attempts to discern the precise
boundaries which the communications, copyright, antitrust and other laws
place upon this right are at the center of a number of lawsuits, laws and
administrative regulations.4 8
9-12 and accompanying text, suggests that the home club has exclusive broadcasting rights absent
agreement to the contrary. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Of course, the court was
not called upon in that case to adjudicate the conflicting rights of the two clubs.
46. Gross Telecasting Co., Inc. v. Michigan State Univ., No. G-81-712-CA 6 (W.D. Mich.
filed Sept. 15, 1981).
47. Defendant's Brief in Support of their Renewed Motion to Dismiss and For Summary
Judgment at 1.
A review of the Handbook of the Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference provides little guidance.
Appendix XI(d) recognizes for football radio that a "radio station [may sign] a contract to broadcast
both the home and away regularly scheduled games of a conference member," but that "the
host university shall determine whether broadcasting rights may be sold." For basketball televi-
sion (at issue here), Appendix XI(3)(B) merely states that "the fee for a live or delayed telecast
shall be negotiated by each conference member."
48. This Article focuses upon sports property right issues. But they certainly are not the only
sports issues affected by federal regulations. For example, the FCC requires on-air disclosure
of the relationship of announcers to sports teams. See Announcer Selection in Sports Broad-
casting, 48 F.C.C.2d 235 (1974). The FCC limits the dissemination of horse racing and gambling-
related information. See 36 F.C.C. 1571 (1964). But see 48 Fed. Reg. 49,879 (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (proposed Oct. 28, 1983); see also FCC reaction to point-spread programs
in letter from Charles Kelly, Chief, Enforcement Division, Mass Media Bureau to Philip R.
Hochberg, Dec. 8, 1983 (on file with authors). Likewise, telecasting of certain sporting events
where product identification is quite apparent can raise questions of program-length commer-
cials. See Program-Length Commercials, 29 R.R.2d 469, 487 (1974).
Sports also has played a tangential role in regulations affecting prime time programming; the
networks have received special permission to run-over into what has been time reserved for local
programs. See, e.g., In re National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 83 F.C.C.2d 264 (1980). Another
area of regulation which concerns sports is the cost of program transmissions. See American
Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 70 F.C.C.2d 2031 (1979).
Various aspects of sports broadcasting rights have surfaced periodically in Congress, beyond
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A. Cable Retransmission of Sports Telecasts
One of the most severe and anomalous limitations placed upon the sports
clubs is that which involves the retransmission of their telecasts by cable
systems. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, cable systems possess a "com-
pulsory license" to retransmit whatever television programming is authorized
by the rules of the FCC-that is, they may carry any of this programming
without obtaining the consent of the copyright owners or the originating televi-
sion stations (although cable systems do have the option of negotiating for
program rights if they so choose). 9 Cable is the only communications medium
which has been permitted to present the accounts and descriptions of the clubs'
games without negotiating for the right to do so." A substantial question
the legislative decisions in cable television, copyright, pooling and blackout discussed infra. For
example, in 1976, the House of Representatives established a Select Committee on Professional
Sports, chaired by California Democrat B.F. Sisk. The Sisk Committee heard from 89 witnesses,
a number of which were in the area of sports broadcasting. See Hearings Before the House
Select Committee on Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The sole legislative recom-
mendation was that a new anti-blackout bill be adopted in the 95th Congress. See H.R. REP. No.
1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
Complaints of abuses in the televising of sports events led to a specific investigation by the
Communications Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
in late 1977. Serial No. 95-98, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. The Subcommittee was concerned with the
role of the television networks in program procurement, particularly in regard to broadcast con-
tracts for the 1980 Winter and Summer Olympics, boxing events, "winner-take-all" tennis matches
and matters dealing with sports coverage. A subsequent staff study found numerous practices
which the staff urged be referred to the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, Department of Justice, or the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Com-
merce Committee.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d) (Supp. V 1982); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 24, at
88-101; Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the Revised Copyright Act, 27 CAT-. U.L. REV.
263 (1978); Note Copyright Owners v. Cable Television: The Evolution of a Copyright Liability
Conflict, 33 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 693 (1982); Note, Cable Television's Compulsory License: An
Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, 25 N.Y.L. Sc. L. REv. 925 (1980).
The Supreme Court had held that cable's retransmission of television signals did not constitute
copyright infringement under the 1909 Copyright Act. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968). Cable's copyright liability was debated by Congress for more than a decade
before enactment of the 1976 law. For a number of years, the copyright bills considered by
Congress excluded sports from compulsory licensing, in part because its ephemeral nature made
it unique among programming fare. SENATE JuDiciARY COMM., DRAFT REPORT To Accom'ANY
S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974); S. REP. No. 1035, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 67-70 (1974);
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., DRAFT
REPORT To AccOMPANY S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1969). Ultimately, however, the sports
issue was considered a matter of "communications" rather than copyright policy, and sports
programming was included in the compulsory license. See S. RaP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
80 (1975).
50. Apparently, no sports club has ever challenged a cable system under common law theories,
such as in the Pittsburgh Athletic and National Exhibition cases discussed above. The activities
of cable-systems would appear to be indistinguishable from those of the defendants in these
cases. To the extent that a club records its telecasts, section 301(a) of the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(a) (Supp. V 1982), likely preempts such a challenge. Under section 301(b), 17 U.S.C. § 301(b),
however, the preemption doctrine would not foreclose a common law claim with respect to telecasts
that have not been recorded. See also H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, supra note 24, at 52.
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exists whether there is any justification for continuing this special privilege.5 1
Nevertheless, Congress has not yet demonstrated any willingness to abolish
cable's compulsory license.2
Because of the compulsory license, sports clubs have virtually no control
over cable's distribution of games which are broadcast by conventional televi-
sion stations. Their only right of control emanates from certain FCC rules
which restrict some of cable's importation of sports telecasts from distant
markets. Before considering the relevant FCC rules, it is useful to focus on
the one and only benefit that the clubs receive from compulsory licensing-a
share of the royalties paid by cable systems.
1. Royalty Payments
In return for its compulsory license, each cable system must deposit semi-
annually a statutorily prescribed royalty fee with the Copyright Office. 3 These
royalties are then distributed by a second governmental agency, the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, to the copyright owners of non-network television programs
which cable systems import into distant markets.5 4 The first royalty fund (that
for the year 1978) amounted to about $15 million when distributed; the 1982
fund amounted to slightly over $40 million.
The Copyright Act does not provide the Tribunal with any guidance
as to how the royalties should be allocated among eligible copyright owners.
Thus, the question of how much the sports clubs and copyright owners of
other television programming should receive has been the subject of extensive
litigation before the Tribunal and the courts during the past few years. 55
51. See generally Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess.
(1981-82); SHOOSHAN & JACKSON, INC., CABLE COPYRIGHT AND CONSUMER WELFARE: THE HIDDEN
COST OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSE (1981); Bensen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright Liability for
Cable Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1978);
Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Marketplace Model, 2 COM./ENT.
L.J. 477 (1981); Ladd, Schrader, Leibowitz & Older, Copyright Cable, the Compulsory License:
A Second Chance, 3 CoM. & L., Summer 1981, at 3; Address of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman,
FCC, to the Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
26, 1982) (on file with authors); Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General,
to Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Mar. 20, 1982) (on file with authors).
52. One interesting question is whether the courts would strike down the compulsory license.
At least one commentator has argued that cable's compulsory license is unconstitutional. See
Winner, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Compulsory Licensing Under the Cable Portion of the
Copyright Act, Antitrust, and Unpredictability, 3 CoM. & L., Fall 1981, at 41, 60-61.
53. 17 U.S.C. § I1 l(d)(2) (Supp. V 1982). For discussion of the nature and legislative history
surrounding adoption of the cable royalty rates, see Hatfield & Garrett, A Reexamination of the
Cable Television Compulsory Licensing Rates: The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the
Marketplace, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 433 (1983).
54. 17 U.S.C. § I 1 (d)(4)-(5). For a discussion of the Tribunal's general responsibilities under
the Act, see Korman & Koenigsburg, The First Proceeding Before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal:
ASCAP and the Public Broadcasters, 1 CoM. & L., Winter 1979, at 15.
55. The major parties who have claimed a share of the royalty pool on behalf of their consti-
tuents include the Motion Picture Association of America (representing the producers and
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Most of the parties originally supported a formula pursuant to which the
royalties would be divided essentially according to the relative amount of time
that the claimants' programming occupied. The Tribunal, however, adopted
a sports proposal to focus upon the relative marketplace values of the various
program categories-looking in particular to the relative benefit which cable
systems receive, and the relative harm caused to the copyright owners, from
the carriage of the programming categories. Utilizing these criteria, and based
upon an extensive evidentiary record, the Tribunal awarded the sports interests
twelve percent of the 1978 royalty fund; this share was increased to fifteen
percent of the 1979 and 1980 royalty funds.6 The Tribunal's allocation of
the 1978 and 1979 funds was, for the most part, affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;57 the 1980 decision
was appealed and then remanded, on the Tribunal's motion, for reconsidera-
tion in light of the court's opinion in the 1979 case. 8
The statutory fee schedule results in what Congress recognized would be
only "modest" royalty payments.5 In fact, the payments amount to about
only one percent of the cable industry's total revenues, less than the industry's
distributors of syndicated shows and movies); the National Association of Broadcasters (representing
television and radio stations); the Public Broadcasting Service (representing educational stations
and producers of educational programming); the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (represent-
ing Canadian radio and television stations and Canadian program producers); National Public
Radio (representing noncommercial radi6 stations and suppliers of noncommercial radio pro-
gramming); the performing rights societies (ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC); the suppliers of religious
programming; and the Joint Sports Claimants (consisting of Major League Baseball, the National
Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, the North American Soccer League, and
the National Collegiate Athletic Association).
Because royalty eligibility is limited to copyright owners of non-network telecasts (see supra
note 54 and accompanying text), the National Football League (all of whose regular and post-
season telecasts are on network TV) has not been a claimant. The non-network limitation also
has reduced the scope of the claims presented by Baseball, the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion and the National Basketball Association, but not the National Hockey League or the North
American Soccer League (which have not had national network contracts in recent years).
56. See 1980 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,552 (1983); 1979 Cable
Royalty Distribution Determination, 47 Fed. Reg. 9,879 (1982); 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution
Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026 (1980). The bulk of the 1978 royalty pool (75%) went to
the claimants represented by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). This pro-
gramming occupies nearly 85% of the time occupied by all programming eligible for an award.
The Tribunal reduced the MPAA share to 70% in the 1979 and 1980 proceedings.
With minor exceptions, the parties have voluntarily agreed to accept the same shares of the
1981 and 1982 royalty funds that they had received for 1979 and 1980.
57. The Tribunal's order allocating the 1978 fund was reviewed in National Ass'n of Broad-
casters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court did remand,
on procedural grounds, for reconsideration of the Tribunal's decision not to award any royalties
to National Public Radio (NPR). The Tribunal subsequently reaffirmed its decision, and no appeal
was taken. 47 Fed. Reg. 24,767 (1982). The Tribunal did award NPR 0.25% of the 1979 and
1980 royalty funds.
The order allocating the 1979 fund was remanded for a reconsideration of the Tribunal's deci-
sion not to award any royalties for religious programming or for broadcasters' contributions
to sports telecasts (see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text) and to radio programs. Chris-
tian Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 700 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
58. See supra note 35.
59. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra noe 24, at 91.
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bill for postage and stationery."0 The royalties received by the clubs each year
are, therefore, relatively minor. The amount which each professional club cur-
rently receives on an annual basis, for example, is less than the average yearly
salary of a single player.
In all probability, the size of the royalty pool (and thus the sports royalties)
will increase in future years. Estimates are that the 1983 pool, for example,
could approach $80 million. The increase in attributable largely to the fact
that the royalties paid by cable systems are tied to their revenues, and cable
revenues are growing. In addition, the Tribunal recently has raised the royalties
paid for one class of distant signal programming-that which is carried as
a consequence of the FCC's decision to repeal its most significant restrictions
on importation of programming from distant markets." Nevertheless, the total
cable royalties to be received by sports clubs in the forseeable -future likely
will fall well short of what would be produced in a free marketplace setting. 2
2. FCC Cable Rules
As noted above, cable's compulsory license extends only to that program-
ming which may be carried pursuant to the FCC's rules. For several years,
the FCC restricted the number of distant signals that cable systems could im-
port; with certain exceptions, cable systems located within television markets
generally were not permitted to import any distant network affiliates or more
than two distant independent signals. The FCC's 1979 decision to repeal these
rules was challenged by the sports interests, as well as by other program sup-
pliers and by broadcasters. However, the decision was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and became effective in June
1981.63
60. Hatfield & Garrett, supra note 53, at 437.
61. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146 (1982) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 308), aff'd, National Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, No. 82-2389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1983);
Hatfield & Garrett, supra note 53; infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
There is, however, legislation pending which would undercut substantially the Tribunal's rate
increase. See S. 1270 and H.R. 3419, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (in effect exempting cable
operations from having to pay the increased rates for carriage of "superstation" WTBS-TV
(Atlanta, Georgia)); H.R. 2904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (permitting all cable operators to
carry at least three distant independents before having to pay the increased rates).
62. As the Tribunal has noted:
[T]he current statutory rates [can]not be considered those that would result from
full marketplace conditions if the compulsory license did not exist. The rates were
established as a legislative compromise, they are arbitrary, and they were intended
to require only a minimum payment on the part of cable operators.
47 Fed. Reg. at 52,154. Compare 5 ERTAIwMNT L. RpR. 20 (Nov. 1983) (noting that Belgian
cable operators recently had agreed to pay 15% of their subscriber revenues to carry programming
originated by various European broadcast stations).
63. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.,
National Football League v. FCC, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); see Note, The Cable-Copyright Con-
troversy Continues-But Not in the Courts, 48 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 661 (1982).
The sports leagues argued before the Commission that the repeal of the distant signal rules
ultimately would reduce the amount of sports programming on conventional television-that
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The repeal of the distant signal rules has been a matter of concern to sports
clubs. By limiting the number of distant signals that could be imported, the
former rules necessarily restricted the number of distant signal sports events
that could be brought into any club's home territory. Absent the rules, cable
systems may import literally hundreds of sports events. 6 On any given day,
for example, a sports club trying to attract fans to its stadium or viewers
to its telecast may find itself having to contend with three or four telecasts
involving other league members. Sports clubs have been concerned that such
unrestrained importation adversely affects gate receipts and broadcast
revenues.65 Moreover, cable operators themselves are increasingly becoming
aware that the importation of distant signals has the potential for substantially
undercutting their pay sports packages.
Two sets of FCC rules are still in effect and provide sports clubs with some
limited-but nevertheless important-control over cable importation of distant
sports events. The first is known as the "Sports" or "Same Game" Rule."'
Pursuant to this Rule, a club may require cable systems within thirty-five miles
to delete the distant signal telecast of that club's home game-provided that
the home game is not televised locally.67 For example, assume that the Los
is, sports clubs, concerned about their lack of control over cable's distribution of conventional
telecasts, would choose to present fewer of these telecasts over the years. See infra note 128.
The FCC's failure to consider the impact of its action upon the supply of sports programming
formed the basis of sports' appeal. The court, however, concluded that the FCC had not acted
arbitrarily. See 652 F.2d at 1150.
64. Cable systems must, of course, pay compulsory licensing royalties to do so. For the larger
systems (those with more $214,000 in semi-annual revenues from basic services), the size of their
royalty payments is linked to the number of distant signals that they import. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(d)(2)(B), as amended, 37 C.F.R. § 308.2 (1983). The cable industry has argued that the
Tribunal's decision to raise substantially the rates for programming carried as a result of FCC
deregulation (see supra note 61 and accompanying text) will deter cable operators from carrying
this programming. Thus, cable contends, the Tribunal's rate decision effectively reimposes the
distant signal rules. See Brief of National Cable Television Association, at 27, National Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, No. 82-2389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1983);
Hearings on H.R. 2904 and H.R. 3419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist & 2d. Sess. (1983-84).
65. See Hearings on H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, 164-67
(1982) (statement of Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball); Hearings on H.R. 5949 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 136-42 (1982) (statement of Bowie K. Kuhn,
Commissioner of Baseball).
Colleges also have been concerned that cable's retransmission of their local non-network
"exception" telecasts into distant markets will result in their being charged with a "regional
appearance," thereby resulting in the loss of potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars in
broadcast revenues. See, e.g., Arkansas Cable Television Ass'n, 62 F.C.C.2d 15 (1977). Reportedly,
Notre Dame University actually paid certain cable systems not to import its non-network telecasts
so that it would not be charged with a regional appearance, a circumstance which seems to set
copyright ownership on its ear.
66. 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (1983). This rule was adopted by the FCC in 1975 after several years
of proceedings. See Report and Order in Docket No. 19417, 54 F.C.C.2d 265, on reconsidera-
tion, 56 F.C.C.2d 561 (1975).
67. The Sports Rule contains multiple exceptions, and requires the clubs to provide cable
systems with timely and proper notification of the telecasts to be deleted. The Rule applies only
to cable systems which are located within 35 miles of a specific reference point in the community
with which the club is identified.
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Angeles Lakers and Chicago Bulls are playing a game in Los Angeles. If the
Lakers are not televising the game in Los Angeles, they may request affected.
cable systems in the Los Angeles area to delete the telecast of the game by
the Bulls."8 A cable system which fails to comply with such a request would
be subject to a fine by the FCC,69 as well as a copyright infringement action
since its compulsory license extends only to programming which is authorized
to be carried under the FCC's rules.
The Sports Rule helps prevent cable systems from frustrating a club's deci-
sion not to televise a particular home game. The primary effect of the Rule
is to protect the club's home gate."0 The Rule, however, also is important
to protecting the clubs' pay cable or subscription television contracts. For
example, if a club could not prevent cable systems from importing its home
games via the visitors' telecasts from Atlanta, New York, Chicago and possibly
elsewhere, important bargaining leverage against the cable or subscription
television operator might be lost.7 '
One other set of FCC rules which affords some limited control over the
distribution of sports telecasts is that which involves network nonduplication. 71
Professional sports clubs, either on their own or through their television
flagship station, often establish a network of stations to televise their games.
For example, the Cubs' flagship, WGN-TV, feeds its telecasts to stations
68. Sports Rule protection also may be available where a cable system seeks to import the
distant telecast of a game broadcast by a national network. The home club involved in that
game may request the deletion of the distant telecast, provided that the telecast is not being
carried by the local affiliate (and provided that none of the other Sports Rule exceptions is
applicable).
69. See, e.g., Major League Baseball and the San Francisco Baseball Club, 50 R.R.2d 39,
reconsideration denied, 50 R.R.2d 582 (Cable TV Bureau 1981) (imposing fines of between $500
and $1500 for the carriage of two telecasts in violation of the Sports Rule). See also Centre
Video Corp., 64 F.C.C.2d 769, 770 (1977) (in a case where the systems failed to delete certain
distant signal hockey telecasts, the FCC warned that the Sports Rule is "clear and unambiguous
and we expect adherence to its provisions in the future. Failure to do so will result in appropriate
administrative action.").
70. The FCC's principal concern was not with protecting the home gate per se, but ensuring
the availability of sports programming on conventional television. The Commission concluded:
Gate receipts are the primary source of revenue for sports clubs, and teams have
a reasonable interest in protecting their home gate receipts from the potentially
harmful financial effects of invading telecasts of their games from distant televi-
sion stations. If cable television carriage of the same game that is being played
locally is allowed to take place, the local team's need to protect its gate receipts
might require that it prohibit the telecasting of its games on television stations which
might be carried on local cable systems. If this were to result, the overall avail-
ability of sports telecasts would be significantly reduced. In light of these considera-
tions, most parties, including the NCTA, have recognized the reasonableness of
a rule which would prohibit same game importations.
54 F.C.C.2d at 281 (footnotes omitted).
71. Part of this leverage is lost in any case since the FCC does not require cable systems
to carry local STV transmissions, thereby potentially depriving a team (and its STV operator)
of access to the cable-only market. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Clubs which take advantage of the Sports Rule do run the risk of incurring the wrath of
those fans who feel they are entitled to view the telecast. It is not uncommon for cable systems
to place a notice on the blacked-out channel suggesting that their subscribers telephone their
complaints directly to the club.
72. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-76.99 (1979).
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located in various Illinois, Indiana and Iowa communities. Under the FCC's
network nonduplication rules, the stations in these communities may be able
to prevent local cable systems from carrying the duplicating WGN-TV
telecast.73 This, of course, preserves the local station as the exclusive outlet
for the event, thereby making the rights acquired by these stations more
valuable.
B. Superstations
In December of 1976 the FCC authorized a so-called "resale common
carrier" to distribute, via satellite, the signal of Ted Turner's television sta-
tion WTBS (then WTCG-TV) (Atlanta, Georgia) to cable operators throughout
the country.74 The Commission subsequently approved applications of other
carriers to distribute via satellite the signals of stations WGN-TV (Chicago,
Illinois) and WOR-TV (New York, New York).15 As of December 1983, these
three "superstations" reached some 28 million, 11 million and 4 million dis-
tant cable households in the United States, respectively 76-as well as an un-
disclosed number of others in Mexico, Canada and the Caribbean."
73. See, e.g., Report and Order in Docket No. 19417, 54 F.C.C.2d 265, 281 n.60 (1975);
Pioneer Cablevision Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 325 (1975); Cable TV of Fairmont, 48 F.C.C.2d 991
(1974), reconsideration denied, 50 F.C.C.2d 976 (1975); Sonic Cable TV, 45 R.R.2d 1247 (Cable
Bureau 1979), aff'd, 48 R.R.2d 1159 (1981); Valley TV Cable Co., 36 R.R.2d 315 (Cable Bureau
1976); Maine Cable Television, Inc., 34 R.R.2d 1452 (Cable Bureau 1975).
There may be some question as to the applicability of these rules where different announcers
are utilized. See, e.g., Sonic Cable TV, 45 R.R.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Cable Bureau 1979), aff'd,
48 R.R.2d 1159 (1981); Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 19417, 56 F.C.C.2d
561, 569-70 (1975).
74. Southern Satellite Sys., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976).
75. Eastern Microwave, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 2195 (1979); United Video, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d
1629 (1978). See generally Tigerman, The Growing Problem of Involuntary Superstations, 12
J. oF ARTS MGMT. & L. 51 (1982). Other stations approved by the FCC for full-time satellite
distribution are WSBK-TV (Boston, Massachusetts); KTTV (Los Angeles, California); and KTVU-
TV (San Francisco, California). KTVU-TV was, in fact, delivered via satellite for a period of
time in 1978 and 1979. None of the other signals, however, has ever been placed on satellite.
The resale carrier of WGN-TV, United Video, has announced that it will place WPIX-TV (New
York, N.Y.) on satellite commencing May 1, 1984.
Even prior to the FCC's action, these and other television signals have been distributed to
cable operators via terrestrial microwave; many television signals continue to receive extensive
microwave distribution, such as WPIX-TV (the Yankees' flagship which is available throughout
New England and the mid-Atlantic states into West Virginia). The costs of transmitting via
microwave are, however, distance-sensitive. Consequently, a principal effect of satellite distribu-
tion is that the stations can reach a much larger nationwide audience than those stations delivered
only via microwave.
76. Cablevision, Dec. 19, 1983, at 195.
77. The FCC has authorized the resale carriers to provide the superstations to customers
outside the United States, provided that they obtain the approvals necessitated by international
law. See Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981). Negotiations to obtain
approvals from Bermuda have been successfully completed. See United Video, Inc., F.C.C. File
No. I-T-C-3163 (Com. Car. Bureau released Aug. 19, 1983). The National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce and the State Depart-
ment have urged the FCC to stay its decision unless and until the United States has received
assurances that the interests of U.S. copyright owners will be adequately protected. See also
H.R. REP. No. 192, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1983) ("expecting" that the State Department
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A prime characteristic of each of the superstations is its heavy concentra-
tion of sports programming. These three stations alone present nearly 600
telecasts each season of Major League Baseball, National Basketball Associa-
tion, National Hockey League and North American Soccer League games,7
as well as a number of collegiate sports telecasts. None of the sports clubs,
however, has authorized the resale carriers to place its telecasts on satellite.
The resale carriers have done so without the consent of, and without paying
any compensation to, the clubs or any copyright owner or the stations
themselves. 7'
The question whether the resalers' activities constitute copyright infringe-
ment was addressed in litigation involving the New York Mets. Eastern
Microwave, Inc. (EMI), the resale carrier of WOR-TV, sought a declaratory
judgment that its unconsented retransmission of Mets' telecasts on WOR-TV
is exempt from copyright liability under various provisions of the Copyright
Act. In one of the few victories achieved by the 1982 Mets," a federal district
court rejected EMI's position. 8 The district court's decision was most signifi-
"will endeavor to obtain assurances from the foreign countries concerned that they will negotiate
the appropriate procedures with the American copyright owners . . ").
A number of Western Hemisphere television stations, cable systems, hotels, condominiums
and others already are receiving the signals of the superstations (and other satellite programm-
ing) without the consent of the resale carriers, the stations or the copyright owners of the pro-
gramming on these stations. Efforts to deal with such international piracy may very well become
a significant priority of copyright owners in future years. See generally Statement of David Ladd,
Register of Copyrights, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 15, 1983) (on file with the authors).
One effort by the U.S. Government to deal with this international piracy can be seen in the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Interest & Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983). Caribbean countries are not eligible for CBI trade benefits if
they rebroadcast United States copyrighted material through any "government owned" entity
without the express consent of the copyright holder. In deciding whether to grant CBI benefits,
the United States Government also takes into account whether and to what extent the Caribbean
country affords protection to copyright owners.
The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) also has taken
steps to transform certain U.S. television stations into Canadian "superstations." In March 1983
the CRTC authorized the satellite distribution of four U.S. signals (including KING-TV, which
broadcasts the games of the Seattle Mariners) to cable operators in relatively small markets
throughout Canada. See Canadian Satellite Communications, Inc., Decision CRTC 83-126 (released
Mar. 8, 1983).
78. Hearings on H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Pro-
tection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 140
(1982) (statement of Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball). The presence of sports pro-
gramming on these signals is a major reason for their selection and development as supersta-
tions. See, e.g., Broadcasting, June 27, 1983, at 68, 70.
79. But see infra note 88.
80. The 1982 Mets and Cubs fought an intense battle for last place in the National League
East with the Mets finally edging out the Cubs during the final weeks of the season.
81. Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
EMI had claimed that its transmissions are not "public performances" within the meaning
of section 101 of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); thus, it had not infringed any of the exclusive
rights (id., § 106) which are afforded the Mets under the Copyright Act. The district court held
that EMI's activities constitute "public performances." 534 F. Supp. at 535-37. The same con-
clusion was reached with respect to another resale carrier in WGN Continental Broadcasting
Co. v. United Video, Inc., withdrawn and republished at 693 F.2d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1982),
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cant since its practical effect would have been to require resale carriers, for
the first time, to negotiate with sports clubs and other copyright owners. This
would have provided clubs not only with an additional source of revenue,
but with some measure of control over the distribution of their telecasts.
The Mets' court-room victory, like many of its winning streaks, was short-
lived. Some six months after the district court's decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that EMI's activities come
within the "passive carrier" exemption of the Copyright Act. 2 According
to the appeals court, a contrary conclusion would "frustrate" the congres-
sional intent underlying the cable television compulsory licensing scheme-
that is, to the extent that resale carriers are unable to negotiate satisfactory
arrangements with copyright owners, cable systems would be denied distant
signal programming which would otherwise be available pursuant to the Act's
compulsory licensing scheme.8 3
It is possible that the EMI decision will not be the last word on this sub-
ject. A case raising essentially the same issues as those in EMI is pending
in another federal district court." Moreover, the development of new forms
and was supported by the Register of Copyrights in an amicus brief filed in the EMI litigation.
Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 127 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983).
The other claim rejected by the district court was that EMI's activities qualify for the "passive
carrier" exemption of section 111(a)(3) of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1982). See 534 F.
Supp. at 537-38. This exemption permits the retransmission of television signals by
any carrier who has no direct or indirect control over the content or selection of
the primary transmission or over the particular recipients of the secondary transmis-
sion, and whose activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely
of providing wires, cable, or other communications channels for the use of others
82. 691 F.2d 125, 129-32 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983); see supra note
81. The court of appeals' decision is criticized in Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Televi-
sion Industry: Satellite Retransmission and the Passive Carrier Exemption, 51 FoRDHs m L. REv.
637 (1983), and praised in Note, Crossed Signals: Copyright Liability for Resale Carriers of Televi-
sion Broadcasts, 16 IND. L. REv. 611 (1983). See also Note, Allocating Copyright Liability to
Telecommunications Common Carriers Supplying Cable Systems, 67 MnN. L. REv. 963 (1983).
83. 691 F.2d at 132-33.
During the pendency of the EMI litigation, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the National Cable Television Associa-
tion (NCTA)-without the involvement of the sports interests-entered into a compromise agree-
ment concerning the cable provisions of the Copyright Act. In return for certain concessions
made by the NCTA, the NAB agreed to an amendment which would have overturned the district
court decision in EML See Letter from Vincent Wasilewski, President NAB, to Thomas Wheeler,
President, NCTA at 2 (Mar. 18, 1982) (on file with authors). The compromise ultimately was
embodied in a bill. See H.R. 5949, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Consistent with the compromise,
the committee report accompanying this bill stated that the district court incorrectly construed
the passive carrier exemption. H.R. REP. No. 559, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1982).
The court of appeals in EMI found this committee report to be of "general interest;" however,
it said that the report did not influence its interpretation of congressional intent surrounding
the 1976 Act. 691 F.2d at 129 n.11. See also 128 CONG. REc. S16006 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982)
(statement of Senator Mathias) (provision of H.R. 5949 overturning the district court decision
in EMI constitutes a "major change in the present copyright law and represents a sharp depar-
ture from prior policy"). The bill embodying the- compromise was never enacted into law. See
Fitzpatrick & Sherman, 97th Congress Reconciles Few Copyright Debates, Legal Times, Feb.
7, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
84. A Minnesota television station has sued WTBS and its resale carrier under the Copyright
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of potential superstation distribution-most significantly direct broadcast
satellites (DBS)15-may renew copyright owner interests in securing control.
Wholly apart from the EMI control issues, the superstation phenomenon has
generated (and likely will continue to generate) other litigation involving the
rights of sports interests which deal with the superstations. Two decisions
illustrate this point.
The first involved a lawsuit by American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
and a number of Major League Baseball clubs against the Atlanta Braves
and its commonly owned flagship station WTBS.86 Under the terms of the
then-existing contract between ABC and Major League Baseball, ABC
possessed the exclusive nationwide rights to televise Baseball's 1982 League
Championship Series (LCS); the sole exception to the exclusivity granted ABC
was that each of the participating teams had the right to televise their playoff
games over their local flagship stations. At the time this exception was
negotiated, only the most clairvoyant might have imagined that more than
25 million households across the country could view the WTBS telecasts of
the Braves in the LCS. However, when it became apparent that "America's
Team" (as the Braves have been marketed) would play in the 1982 LCS, ABC
and the clubs which comprised Baseball's Television Committee filed a lawsuit.
They sought to enjoin the WTBS telecast of the LCS, claiming that the satellite
Act. The station has alleged that it possesses the exclusive right to broadcast certain programming
in its market, and that the retransmission of this same programming over WTBS into the
station's market is unlawful. The resale carrier has defended relying in part upon the passive
carrier exemption. Hubbard Broadcasting Co. v. Southern Satellite Sys., Inc., No. 3-81-Civil
330 (D. Minn. filed May 29, 1981).
85. The FCC has authorized several entities to transmit programming and other material
via satellite directly to individual homes equipped with special receiving antennae. See supra note
5. Reportedly station WTBS was has held discussions with various DBS applicants about the
possibility of their retransmitting the WTBS signal. See Multichannel News, July 4, 1983, at
5; Cablevision, July 11, 1983, at 17. The question which the EMI decision raises is whether
the DBS operators need the consent of WTBS and affected copyright owners. See Broadcasting,
Nov. 21, 1983, at 28 (quoting the President of the WTBS resale carrier to the effect that there
are " 'tons of copyright problems' . . . but there were solutions to them").
A related issue is whether a resale entity like EMI could "cherry-pick" the most attractive
sports and other programming broadcast by a number of stations throughout the United States-
that is, compile a programming package with a Yankees' telecast on one night, a Dodgers' telecast
on another night, and a Cubs' telecast perhaps once every other year. Such program selection
should fall outside the Copyright Act's "passive carrier" immunity. In any event, a cherry-picked
service would be substantially more costly to certain cable operators than any service which they
currently receive.
Generally, those cable operators with more than $214,000 in semi-annual gross receipts from
basic services must pay the full royalty for any distant signal imported, regardless of the amount
of time that the signal is carried; carriage of a signal for even one day obligates the cable operator
for a six-month payment. Letter from Jon A. Baumgarten, Copyright Office General Counsel,
to R. Clark Wadlow, Esq. (July 18, 1978) (on file with the authors). Moreover, the distant pro-
gramming carried would typically be subject to the higher royalty rates recently adopted by the
Tribunal (see supra note 61 and accompanying text) because it could not have been carried
under the former FCC rules. Thus, for example, a "cherry-picked" service which utilized the
programming from four stations might cost a cable operator nearly 15% of its basic subscriber
revenues in royalty payments.
86. ABC Sports, Inc. v. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 6104 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 14, 1982).
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distribution of the WTBS telecasts to millions of cable subscribers nation-
wide would violate ABC's contractual exclusivity. 7
The district court granted the requested preliminary injunction. In doing
so, it found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing that the
broadcasts of the LCS by WTBS constituted a breach of Baseball's contract
with ABC; tortious interference with this contract; and unfair competition
against ABC.8" The Braves did not last long in the LCS, losing three straight
to the Cardinals, and efforts have been made to resolve the case without
appellate review or a trial on the merits. 9
A second case involving the rights of sports interests vis-a-vis superstations
was Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (NCAA),9°
where the Atlanta ABC affiliate challenged on contractual grounds the broad-
cast of NCAA football over WTBS. This challenge was unsuccessful. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that there had been "no meeting of the minds"
between ABC and the NCAA as to whether their contract for collegiate foot-
ball telecasts would prevent NCAA from licensing a supplemental package
of such telecasts to WTBS. Accordingly, the court overturned an order en-
joining WTBS from telecasting NCAA football,"' thereby allowing the nation-
87. Each of ABC's affiliates might have been able to require local cable systems to delete
the WTBS telecast of the LCS pursuant to the FCC's network nonduplication rules. See supra
notes 72-73 and accompanying text. However, ensuring that cable systems comply with network
nonduplication requests poses a number of administrative and practical problems.
88. ABC Sports, Inc. v. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 6104 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 4, 1982) (order and opinion granting preliminary injunction).
The court was not persuaded by the claim that the Braves and WTBS had no power to prevent
the satellite distribution of the station. The court specifically referred to the "overwhelming"
evidence that WTBS (unlike the other superstations) actively promoted and profitted from its
nationwide coverage. It is not clear whether the court would have reached a different result
in the case if such evidence had been lacking.
Also, the court's decision focused upon the particular contractual agreement involved in this
case-specifically, (1) whether the Braves and other clubs had given the Commissioner of Baseball
the authority to enter into an agreement which grants ABC exclusivity against competing cablecasts;
and (2) whether ABC had waived its rights to prohibit such cablecasts because it had failed
to exercise those rights in the past. The court further noted that WTBS had sold significant
advertising time to a major brewery-in direct competition with ABC's sale to another brewery.
89. Two months before the close of the 1983 season, Turner sought a declaratory judgment
that the Braves' then-anticipated performance in the 1983 LCS could be broadcast solely "within
the local Atlanta Area." Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
No. C83-1647A (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 5, 1983). This case also was settled. Under the terms of
the settlement, Turner was permitted to assign the WTBS local broadcast rights to NBC's Atlanta
affiliate, Station WXIA-TV. WXIA would be permitted to preempt the network feed and to
broadcast the WTBS feed, complete with the Braves' announcers. Communications Daily, Sept.
7, 1983, at 7. The case was mooted, for all practical purposes, when the Braves dismantled Chief
Nok-a-homa's teepee to make room for additional seats in the outfield. The Braves immediately
went into a tailspin, losing the Western Division crown to the Los Angeles Dodgers.
90. 250 Ga. 391, 297 S.E.2d 733 (1982).
91. Concluding that both ABC and the NCAA had engaged in "sharp practices in contract
negotiations," the lower court reserved special criticism for the NCAA: "[A] tortured construc-
tion is necessary to find in said agreement that WTBS or any 'superstation' could broadcast
the series; $17,500,000 [the price received by the NCAA] provides great incentive to twist words
out of their clear meaning and plain intent." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. NCAA, No. C-89120,
slip. op. at 11 (Super. Ct. Fulton Cty., Ga. Aug. 20, 1982). In an apparent effort to fashion
a rough sort of justice, the lower court granted relief which no one had sought. The court ruled
that WTBS could carry the NCAA telecasts in 1982, but not in 1983, 1984, or 1985 (even though
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wide distribution of these football telecasts over the superstation in competi-
tion with the ABC broadcasts (including those by the Atlanta ABC affiliate).
Both superstation lawsuits necessarily turn upon specific contractual inter-
pretations. Thus, their precedential value may be limited. The litigation,
however, underscores the legal problems that the sports interests face in deal-
ing with the superstations. Because of the increasingly widespread and un-
controlled distribution of the superstations, any dealings between sports clubs
and the superstations will be closely scrutinized by affected parties.
C. Piracy of Satellite Transmissions and Pay Telecasts
Sports clubs, leagues and their licensed broadcasters routinely utilize satellites
to relay telecasts from game sites to the home market of the visiting club
or to network control points. 92 Technologically, these satellite transmissions
may be intercepted by anyone possessing an "earth station" or receiving
"dish. ' 93 With the recent proliferation of earth stations,9" sports clubs have
become increasingly concerned about the unauthorized interception and
rebroadcast of their satellite transmissions.
The FCC has issued various statements to the effect that such conduct
violates the Communications Act of 1934. 91 Section 605 of the Act96 prohibits
WTBS had not contracted for the latter two years). The court further held that the ABC affiliate
which brought the suit could carry two Georgia and two Georgia Tech games, without those
institutions being charged with NCAA appearances (even though the affiliate had not sought
the right to originate these games). Id.
92. Sports and satellites go back a long way. In 1961 two minutes of a Cubs-Phillies telecast
were placed on the Telstar satellite and beamed to millions of Europeans (unfortunately, none
of whom were Cubs fans).
93. Program rights holders have considered "scrambling" the satellite transmissions so that
they are available only to those with sophisticated decoders. Because of the costs and other prob-
lems associated with scrambling, scrambling may not be a viable means of protecting all satellite
transmissions. See Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
89-91 (1981) (statement of Andy Setos).
94. The costs of owning earth stations have declined dramatically during recent years. While
the price tag in 1976 was over $100,000, today acceptable equipment can be purchased for be-
tween $3,500 and $10,000. As a result, there has been a significant increase in the utilization
of earth stations. By the end of 1981, there were some 30,000 such stations in place, and new
units being produced at a rate of some 2,000 to 3,000 per month. Id. at 114-15.
On the other hand, the FCC recently has decided to decrease the orbital spacing between satellites.
See Report and Order in CC Docket No. 81-704, 54 R.R.2d 577 (1983). This has raised questions
in the industry as to whether many of the smaller, less expensive earth stations will become
obsolete because of the increased potential for interference. See Multichannel News, July 4, 1983,
at 8; Communications Daily, June 30, 1983, at 3-4.
95. First Report and Order in CC Docket No. 78-374, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, 215-16 (1979);
Unauthorized Interception and Use of Satellite Transmission, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,581 (1978); Hear-
ings Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 216-17 (1981) (statement
of Stephen Sharp, FCC General Counsel); Telecommunications Reports, Oct. 3, 1983, at 41.
See generally Piscitelli, Home Satellite Viewing: A Free Ticket to the Movies?, 35 FED. CoM.
L.J. 1 (1983); Note, Pay Television Legal Protection Against Interception; Backyard Earth Stations
Amplify Current Imperfections, 87 DicK. L. REv. 95 (1982); Note, Receive-Only Satellite Earth
Stations and Piracy of the Airwaves, 58 No'm DAmE LAW. 84 (1982).
96. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
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the interception and retransmission of any "radio communications" which
are not broadcast "for the use of the general public." Notwithstanding the
FCC's pronouncements, various commercial establishments (such as bars,
hotels and restaurants) seeking to attract sports-minded patrons have utilized
earth stations to offer sports telecasts not otherwise available in their
communities."
In March 1983, the National Football League (NFL) and Miami Dolphins
brought a lawsuit against a number of such commercial establishments in the
Miami area which showed the intercepted satellite transmissions of certain
Dolphins' home games.98 Because some of these games had not been sold
out, the network telecasts of the games were to be "blacked out" within the
Dolphins' home territory.9 9 Even where the games were shown on Miami televi-
sion, the plaintiffs were concerned because the intercepted satellite transmis-
sion was of a "clean feed"-that is, it did not contain any of the commer-
cials inserted by the networks or their affiliates.' The NFL and Dolphins
charged the defendants with copyright infringement under the 1976 Copyright
Act; violations of section 605 of the Communications Act; and violations of
state laws regarding the team's right of publicity.
After a bench trial on the merits, the district court held for the NFL and
Dolphins on their copyright and section 605 counts, and entered a preliminary
injunction against the defendants that had not settled. The court rejected defen-
dants' claims that the telecasts of sports events are non-copyrightable news
in the public domain; that defendants' showing of the telecasts did not con-
stitute an actionable public performance; and that any performance was exempt
under section 110(5) of the Act.'
97. See, e.g., LA Times, June 3, 1983, pt. III, at 4 ("Satellite dishes are becoming increas-
ingly popular at restaurants and bars that cater to sports fans."); Sports Media News, Jan. 1983,
at 6 ("The Canadian government is waging a campaign against the use of satellite-receiving dishes
in Canada to pirate U.S. television signals; . . . they are . . . concerned with attendance at
Canadian Football League games."); Variety, Mar. 30, 1983, at 94 ("[T]he CFL has complained
that ticket sales have declined because bars in league cities where home games are blacked out
on commercial television have pirated the signal from ESPN [the cable origination network which
provides CFL games to cable systems via a U.S. satellite] .... ").
"The New York Post on October 3, 1980 reported that 'More than 10,000 persons watched
the Ali-Holmes fight on a Miami street last night-courtesy of a local engineer who pirated
the satellite transmission of the closed-circuit microwaves .... He said he is currently in the
business of selling similar hookups to the public .... .' " Hearings on H.R. 4727 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1981) (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Association of America).
See also S. 2437, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5176, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (authorizing
home viewing of satellite-delivered programming).
98. National Football League v. The Alley Inc., No. 83-0701 CIV-JWK (S.D. Fla. filed Mar.
25, 1983).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 147-61.
100. In place of the commercials, the viewer was able to see and hear the supposedly "off-
air" commentary of the announcer and other network personnel. Thus, it is understandable why
ABC sportscaster Al Michaels has remarked, "I've learned you keep your mouth shut during
commercial breaks . . . ." LA Times, June 3, 1983, pt. III, at 4.
101. Declaratory Judgment and Injunction (filed Sept. 18, 1983); Order Containing .Findings
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A related lawsuit has been brought by the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) and its Corpus Christi, Texas, affiliate against a cable system which
had retransmitted to its subscribers the satellite "clean feed" of the 1983 Super
Bowl XVII.10 2 The complaint charges the system with copyright infringement," 3
as well as violations of section 605 of the Communications Act and a com-
parable Texas statute. Unlike the defendants in the Florida NFL litigation,
the defendant here claimed that its carriage of the satellite transmission was
inadvertent-that is, it allegedly did not know that its earth station was receiv-
ing the clean feed of the Super Bowl.0 4 It is not uncommon for cable operators,
particularly those with large channel capdcity, to be unaware of precisely what
is being transmitted to their subscribers at any given time. Thus, this case
may raise an issue whether cable systems have any affirmative obligations
to ensure that they do not engage in the unauthorized interception of satellite
transmissions.
Piracy of sports telecasts has not been limited to satellite transmissions.
A case in point is that which was filed by SportsVision against some sixteen
bars and restaurants in the Chicago area."' SportsVision, a joint venture of
the Chicago White Sox, Bulls, Blackhawks and Sting, presented the games
of these teams over STV and pay cable. The defendants allegedly used special
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (filed Dec. 29, 1983) (appeal pending).
17 U.S.C. § 110(5) exempts any performance or display of work by a "single receiving ap-
paratus of a kind commonly used in private homes"-provided there is no admission charge.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 24, at 75. The evidence presented by the NFL and Dolphins
established that earth stations are not "receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes."
The NFL and Tampa Bay Buccaneers filed a similar lawsuit against Tampa area bars which
intercepted clean-feed satellite transmissions of NFL games not intended for broadcast in the
Tampa area. National Football League v. Campagnolo Enter., Inc., No. 83-1205-Civ.-T-13 (M.D.
Fla. filed Sept. 22, 1983). This case was settled by the parties.
102. National Broadcasting Co. v. Athena Cablevision of Corpus Christi, Inc., No. C-83-120
(S.D. Tex. filed June 16, 1983).
NBC also has filed a complaint with the FCC against this system and two others which had
retransmitted Super Bowl XVII. In its FCC complaint, NBC has underscored the seriousness,
from the broadcasters' standpoint, of pirating "clean feeds:"
It should be emphasized that the type of piracy at issue here-if left unchecked-
could have serious consequences for the future ability of broadcasters to bring major
sporting events to the public. It is essential that networks and stations which ac-
quire and pay for sporting event rights on an exclusive basis have the benefit of
this exclusivity. Advertisers who purchase time for their announcements do so on
the basis that viewers who see television coverage of the event will also see their
announcement. Piracy of the type which occurred here undermines the exclusivity
which underlies the price paid by advertisers and, thus, to the source of revenue
that makes broadcaster presentations of significant sporting events possible.
103. The complaint alleges that the NFL, which is not a party, owns the copyright to the
live telecast of the Super Bowl. However, the NFL (by written agreement) transferred to NBC
the exclusive live U.S. television rights to the Super Bowl, and NBC transferred to its co-plaintiff
affiliate the exclusive right to televise the Super Bowl in the Corpus Christi area.
104. Apparently, NBC and the NFL had authorized a major pay cable programming service,
Home Box Office (HBO), to transmit a separate feed of the game to HBO executives in Puerto
Villarta, Mexico. HBO used a satellite transponder which normally was devoted to another pro-
gramming service. The defendant, a subscriber to this other service, simply failed to "turn off"
the earth station when that service was not on the air.
105. Multichannel News, June 27, 1983, at 22.
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decoder boxes to receive the programming without the consent of (and without
paying any compensation to) SportsVision. The courts generally have held
that such conduct is violative of section 605 of the Communications Act.1 0 6
D. Unauthorized Excerpting of Game Highlights
In recent years it has become commonplace for broadcasters to present,
as part of their daily news shows, the videotaped highlights of games involving
professional and collegiate sports teams. 07 Because the telecasts of many games
are relayed via satellite, local broadcasters equipped with earth stations have
a wide variety of clubs whose highlights are potentially available; they are
not limited to showing those broadcast by stations in their own area. Thus,
sports fans across the country are routinely treated to the extraordinary plays
of teams such as the Cubs and Mets, all of whose telecasts are available via
satellite. ,08
The question whether game highlights may be broadcast without the con-
sent of the clubs or their licensees was addressed by a federal district court
in New Boston Television, Inc. v. Entertainment Sports Programming Net-
work, Inc. 1o9 There, the Boston Red Sox, Boston Bruins and Station WSBK-
TV (Boston, Massachusetts) brought a copyright infringement action against
the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) and certain
Boston-area cable systems. ESPN, without the consent of and over the
objections of the plaintiffs, taped the WSBK-TV telecasts of Red Sox and
Bruins games and then excerpted highlights of these games for presentation
on its nightly news show "Sportscenter." This show, along with ESPN's other
programming fare, was delivered via satellite to cable systems throughout the
United States, including those within the Boston area where plaintiffs had
been selling their highlights to local television stations.
106. E.g., Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983); National Subscription
Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications Group v.
Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer
Technology, 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.
Tex. 1982); American Television and Communications Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529
F. Supp. 617 (D. Colo. 1982); United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich 1980);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
Contra, Orth-O-Vision v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
107. Since the three national networks have both something to offer (i.e., their own telecasts)
and a need for other product (network and affiliated news and sports programs), network-produced
events are freely traded back and forth. This does not necessarily apply to all events and certain-
ly does not apply where there is no reciprocal footage to be offered. See Amdur, Who Gets
to Use Olympic Footage, New York Times, Dec. 6, 1983, at B16, where ABC denied use of
1980 Olympic hockey footage to a packager of a 1983 U.S.-Soviet game on an independent network.
See also USA Today, Feb. 17, 1984, at 1-D (ABC, the purchaser of broadcast rights to the
1984 Winter Olympics, complained about NBC's unauthorized broadcast of highlights of an
award ceremony and threatened to bar NBC from access to certain highlight films); supra note 20.
108. There may be yet a newer form of nonbroadcast highlight distribution-giant video display
boards (frequently known by their trade names, such as Diamond-Vision or AstroVision) which
are becoming commonplace at stadiums and arenas around the country.
109. 1981 COPYRIGHT LAW REP. (CCH) 25,293, at 16,625 (D. Mass. 1981).
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The district court entered a preliminary injunction against ESPN, concluding
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing that ESPN had in-
fringed the copyright in the Red Sox and Bruins telecasts." ' ESPN volun-
tarily dismissed its appeal of the lower court ruling and ultimately negotiated
a settlement with the plaintiffs. Under the terms of the settlement, ESPN agreed
not to use highlights of the clubs' telecasts without paying a specified fee.
The parties also agreed to submit to the district court the question of the
amount of damages resulting from ESPN's unconsented use of the club's
highlights during the 1979-81 seasons. The court awarded plaintiffs an amount
slightly in excess of $60,000.
The ESPN case marks the first time that any court has considered whether
a club's highlights may be broadcast without the appropriate consent."' The
court's decision to require such consent is particularly significant. Some clubs,
of course, welcome the promotional exposure which comes with the showing
of their highlights; and they have little interest in deterring the practice by
charging a fee for the use of these highlights. What the ESPN decision says,
however, is that the copyright owner of the telecast has the right to charge
such a fee and to place appropriate restrictions on the showing of highlights."
As sports begin to recognize that their highlights have a marketable value,
the ESPN decision will assume substantial importance.
E. Home Taping
The growing popularity of videocassette recorders (VCRs)'" has spawned
considerable controversy over the legality of home videotaping of copyrighted
110. ESPN had defended the action relying upon the "fair use" doctrine, which permits the
reproduction of copyrighted works under certain circumstances. The doctrine is codified in sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. V 1982). The court found that the doctrine
did not shield ESPN's conduct. Perhaps most significantly, the court rejected the assertion that ESPN's
ise of no more than two minutes of each telecast is de minimis within the meaning of the doc-
trine, stating: "[I]t is the quality of the use rather than the quanity which is determinative.
... The excerpts used by defendants in this case, although of relatively short duration, are
the 'highlights' of each broadcast and as such their use may be considered substantial." 1981
CoPv'bolrr LAw REP. (CCH) 25,293, at 16,627.
111. In Pacific & S., Inc., v. Duncan, No. C81-1106 (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 13, 1983).
a federal district court dealt with a similar issue. The defendant in that case was charged with
infringing plaintiff's copyrighted newscasts, by taping the newscasts, excerpting them, and sell-
ing the excerpts to parties who appeared on the air. The court held that defendant's conduct
constituted copyright infringement, and that neither the first amendment nor the fair use doc-
trine sanctioned such conduct. Bizarrely enough, however, the court refused to grant an injunc-
tion or statutory damages, and awarded actual damages of only thirty-five dollars.
112. The question becomes more than academic when delayed broadcasts of the entire event
have been sold and critical footage is excerpted, as was the case with the Holmes-Cooney fight
in June 1982. Taaffe, Tale of the Tape: No Pride Showing at NBC After Fight Replay Fiasco,
Wash. Post, June 18, 1982, at DI. See also supra note 20.
113. In 1976 there were only about 80,000 VCRs in use. TV FAcBooic No. 50, at 79a (1981-82
ed.). VCR sales for 1983 amounted to over 4 million units. Video Week, Jan. 24, 1984, at 7.
One study predicts that by the end of 1988, 35 million households will own VCR's-or three
times the number that currently do. Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1984, at D2.
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television programming. In the celebrated Betamax litigation, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that home taping constitutes copyright
infringement; the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed."" Of
particular significance to the Supreme Court's decision was record evidence
that certain sports interests, as well as other copyright owners, did not object
to home recording.1 5
The Betamax litigation has prompted the introduction of legislation which
would permit home taping while requiring the manufacturers and importers
of blank tape and recording equipment to pay a royalty fee to copyright
owners. Under one current version of the legislation, the fee would be
established by voluntary negotiation among the parties (subject to binding
arbitration if agreement is not reached). These fees would be deposited with
the Copyright Office and distributed to copyright owners, in a manner similar
to cable's compulsory licensing royalties." 6
One survey has shown that sports telecasts account for some 7.5% of the
programming recorded by VCR owners' ' 7-a percentage share which is even
greater than the relative amount of time occupied by cable's retransmission
of distant non-network sports telecasts. Such data suggest that any home taping
royalty pool might prove to be an additional source of income for sports clubs,
as well as a source of controversy.
F. Siphoning-Pay Cable and STV
A major concern of broadcasters, regulators and legislators over the years
has been "siphoning"-the shifting of sports events from conventional televi-
sion to pay cable or subscription television (STV)." 8 In 1968, the FCC pro-
114. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4090 (Jan. 17, 1984),
reversing, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4097. The court relied upon depositions taken some six years earlier.
A petition for rehearing was filed with the Supreme Court, based in part upon affidavits from
officials at the NBA and NHL. The NBA and NHL advised that they now have objections to
home recording in light of a number of developments during the intervening six years. Wash.
Post, Feb. 23, 1984, at D2. On March 19, 1984, the Supreme Court nevertheless denied rehearing.
116. S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 129 CONG. REc. S254 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983)(remarks of Senator Mathias). See generally Broadcasting, Jan. 23, 1984, at 37-38 (noting that
VCR legislation unlikely at least during the current session of Congress).
117. Electronic Media, Feb. 17, 1983, at 16. See also Strine, You Can Bet TV Games Are
Covered, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1983, at C5 (NFL fans have put together "tape networks" to
exchange videotaped NFL games, thereby facilitating betting on future games).
118. For a brief description of the various modes of pay cable and STV, see supra note 5.
A related issue involves ESPN's attempt to market a unique type of pay-cable offering during
the 1983-84 basketball season. In the five-state Atlantic Coast Conference (ACQ area, ESPN
sold a package of ACC games on a special pay-cable basis, while offering the same games on
its basic service in the remainder of the United States. Numerous lawsuits were brought against
ESPN's cable affiliates in North Carolina and Virginia. Variety, Jan. 25, 1984, at 114. See,
e.g., Hart v. Vision Cable of N.C., Inc., No. 83-CVD-3920 (New Hanover Cty. Dist. Ct. Jan.
11, 1984) (order granting preliminary injunction against the showing of the games on a pay basis).
Moreover significant marketing problems arose. Electronic Media, Jan. 26, 1984, at 3. After
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mulgated rules which, among other things, sharply restricted the showing of
sports events by STV operators; these rules subsequently were extended to
pay cable."19 In their final form, the FCC regulations prohibited pay TV,
subscription and cable, from telecasting "specific events" (such as the Rose
Bowl or World Series) which had been on free television at any time during
the preceding five years. The regulations also placed limitations on the number
of "non-specific" events (regular and pre-season home and away games) that
could be placed on pay. 20
The anti-siphoning rules, at least insofar as they applied to pay cable, were
struck down by the United Statps Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Home Box Office v. FCC.'2' The court found that the rules
exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction with respect to cable; were not shown
to be necessary to prevent siphoning; and were violative of the first amend-
ment as being overbroad. Although the court in Home Box Office did not
invalidate the STV anti-siphoning rules, 21 the Commission itself subsequently
repealed these rules, concluding: "STV and pay cable are two communica-
tions activities in direct competition and as a result should be given equal
treatment insofar as program availability is concerned."' 23
There are suggestions throughout the Home Box Office opinion that the
anti-siphoning rules might have been upheld if there had been an adequate
demonstration of the likelihood of siphoning and its harmful effects. Thus,
the court appears to have left open the possibility that anti-siphoning rules
scrapping the plan, ESPN obtained an informal staff ruling from the FCC that the entire area
of pay cable had been preempted by the federal government and local jurisdictions were powerless
to require that certain events not be on pay-cable. See Letter to Ian D. Volner, from Chief,
FCC Mass Media Bureau (Jan. 25, 1984) (on file with authors). The staff ruling, however, did
not address remedies that might be available to individual subscribers for breach of their con-
tractual relationships with their cable systems.
119. See First Report and Order in Docket No. 19554, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1975), reconsideration
denied, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1976); Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 18397, 23
F.C.C.2d 825 (1970); Report and Order in Docket No. 18893, 34 F.C.C.2d 271 (1972); Fourth
Report and Order in Docket No. 11279, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968).
120. If, for example, a team had broadcast less than 25% of its home'games on conventional
television in any of the preceding five years, the rules permitted it to show all the remaining
home games on pay. However, if a team showed 25% or more of that category (home games)
in any of the past five years, it could show only one-half the remaining games on pay. Moreover,
the percentage of games available for pay was subject to a proportionate reduction if the number
of games televised in the current season was less than any time in the past five years. For many
teams whose broadcasting patterns would shift from year to year, the calculations would have
made accurate media scheduling impossible.
121. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See generally Horowitz, The
Implications of Home Box Office for Sports Broadcasts, 23 ANTITRusr BULL. 743 (1978).
122. The original STV rules had been upheld several years earlier in National Ass'n of Theatre
Owners (NATO) v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
The court in Home Box Office, noting the differences between STV (over which the FCC has
a much clearer jurisdictional mandate) and cable, did not purport to overrule the NA TO deci-
sion. Moreover, the court in Home Box Office conditionally upheld the revised STV rules in-
sofar as they differed from those considered in NATO. The case, however, was remanded to
consider the nature and effect of ex parte contacts in the formulation of the STV rules.
123. Report and Order in Docket No. 21489, 42 R.R.2d 1207, 1208 (1978).
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could be imposed by the Commission if it could develop the proper record
support. 24 Also, there is always the spectre of congressional action.'2 5
There has been considerable activity, as of late, involving sports program-
ming distributed by pay cable and STV. Current estimates are that, by the
end of 1984, pay sports networks will be available to some 10 million cable
subscribers; even if only ten percent of these subscribers actually opt for the
sports service, rights holders can expect to receive some $50-$60 million
annually from pay cable.' 26 In many cases, the sports clubs have utilized pay
services as a supplement to their conventional over-the-air television
packages-that is, there has been no diminution of the number of conven-
tional telecasts because pay receives only games not previously scheduled for
telecast. In some cases, however, there has been diminution of over-the-air
telecasts as clubs have established pay packages which probably would not
have been permitted under the former anti-siphoning rules.
27
G. The Sports Broadcast Act of 1961
Another important piece of legislation affecting sports broadcasting is the
Sports Broadcast Act of 1961.'28 The Act immunizes from antitrust liability
the pooled sale of telecasting rights by certain of the professional sports leagues.
Thus, it has allowed the leagues to negotiate such lucrative network television
packages as Sunday afternoon football and the Saturday Baseball Game of
the Week without fear of antitrust prosecution. The Act, however, does have
at least one significant limiting feature. It restricts the ability of the leagues
to define the geographical areas into which the pooled telecasts may be
broadcast. ' 29
124. See, e.g., Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 31.
125. Anti-siphoning bills have, in fact, been introduced but none has been enacted. See, e.g.,
H.R. 15620, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 2239, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). But see S.C.
CODE ANN. § 58-12-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (precluding sale of athletic events by state-
supported colleges to cable where there is the "exclusion of free television.").
126. Kagan, Pay TV Sports, Aug. 23, 1983, at 1-2.
127. It should be noted that these packages involve what the FCC termed "non-specific" events.
One major advantage of placing non-specific events on pay is that the clubs retain control-a
control which they- lack in dealing with conventional over-the-air telecasters. As noted above,
cable systems have a compulsory license to carry whatever conventional telecasts are permitted
by FCC rules; they have no such compulsory license with respect to pay telecasts. Thus a club
may license rights to a television station in its home market only to find a cable system on the
other end of the state importing those very telecasts for a minimal copyright payment and without
the club's consent. If the club places this same package on pay, the cable system may not present
the telecasts unless it negotiates with the club or its agent. Congressional and administrative
failure to deal with the cable distant signal controversy is itself partially responsible for the in-
evitable movement toward pay-a result which cable surely welcomes.
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1982).
129. The A& also is significant in that it protects college and high school football from the
competition that would be posed by NFL telecasts. Section 3 of the Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1293 (1982), excludes from the exemptions any agreement which permits the telecasting of
a professional football game,




For many years the member clubs of the NFL individually sold the televi-
sion rights to their games. Eventually, however, the clubs decided to pool
their rights and to authorize the NFL to market this package-in part as a
response to a league-wide contract signed by the rival American Football
League in 1960. In 1961, the NFL and CBS entered into a two-year contract
granting CBS the exclusive right to televise league games. In United States
v. National Football League,'30 Judge Alan K. Grim held that this contract
violated the antitrust laws.
Before the ink had even dried on Judge Grim's decision, Congress enacted
the Sports Broadcast Act. A principal purpose of the legislation was to over-
rule the decision and thereby
enable the member clubs of a professional football, baseball, basketball,
or hockey league, to pool their separate rights in the sponsored telecasting
of their games and to permit the league to sell the resulting package of
pooled rights to a purchaser, such as a television network, without violating
the antitrust laws."3
Pooling was considered necessary to "assure the weaker clubs of the league
continuing television income and television coverage on a basis of substantial
equality with the stronger clubs.' ' 32 Congress was concerned that absent pool-
beginning on the second Friday in September and ending on the second Saturday.
in December in any year from any telecasting station located within seventy-five
miles of the game site of any intercollegiate or interscholastic football contest
scheduled to be played on such a date ....
To take advantage of section 1293 protection, the affected college or high school must publish
specific notice of its scheduled game and game site prior to August 1. Id. Even this provision
has generated litigation. See Colorado High School Activities Ass'n v. NFL, 711 F.2d 943 (10th
Cir. 1983), affirming, 524 F. Supp. 60 (D. Col. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff had not iden-
tified the "game site" with sufficient particularity).
130. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Eight years earlier Judge Grim had held that certain
NFL rules which restricted the areas into which, and the times when NFL teams could broadcast
were violative of the antitrust laws. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp.
319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); see infra note 148 and accompanying text. In the 1961 case, Judge Grim
concluded that the NFL/CBS contract, which gave CBS rather than individual clubs the power
to determine which games should be telecast and where, was contrary to the judgment entered
in the earlier litigation.
131. S. REP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1178, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1961).
Section I of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), provides in relevant part:
The antitrust laws, as defined in section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended
(38 Stat. 730), or in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall not
apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the
organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey,
by which any league of clubs participating in professional football, baseball, basket-
ball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights
of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted
by such clubs.
132. S. RP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); H.R. RaP. No. 1178, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1961).
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ing, the networks would abandon their policy of televising the games of the
"weaker" clubs. 33 " [S]hould these weaker teams be allowed to flounder, there
is danger that the structure of the league would become impaired and its con-
tinued operation imperiled." 3
It should be noted that the Act sanctions only arrangements of professional
football, baseball, basketball, and hockey leagues-not soccer nor, more im-
portantly, the colleges.' 33 The significance of this fact can best be seen in. Board
of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 36 where the
courts struck down as violative of the antitrust laws the NCAA's Football
Television Plan and television contracts with ABC, CBS and WTBS (worth
more than $280 million).' 37
The NCAA litigation was brought by the Universities of Oklahoma and
133. S. REP. No. 1087, supra note 132, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 1178, supra note 132, at 3.
134. S. REP. No. 1087, supra note 132, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 1178, supra note 132, at 3.
Baseball, of course, enjoys an immunity from the antitrust laws generally. See Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
One court has relied upon the Sports Broadcast Act to conclude that a baseball club's decision
to terminate affiliation with a radio station is not within Baseball's antitrust immunity. See Hender-
son Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc. 541 F. Supp. 263, 269-70 (S.D. Tex.
1982). But see Hale v. Brooklyn Baseball Club, Inc., Civ. Action No. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1958),
noted in id. at 268 n.7 (holding that the Baseball antitrust exemption would cover such conduct).
It appears difficult to reconcile the Henderson rationale with section 4 of the 1961 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1294 (Supp. V 1982), which the Henderson court does not mention. Section 4 provides that the Act
shall not be "deemed" to affect the "applicability or nonapplicability" of the antitrust laws
to any act. See Hearing on H.R. 8757 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Judiciary
Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1961) (testimony of Ford Frick, Commissioner of Baseball)
("We believe that this provision is essential to make it crystal clear that the enactment of this
bill will in no way affect adversely or unfavorably baseball's existing exemption from the an-
titrust laws under the Toolson decision.").
135. The Act has no applicability to pooling arrangements of clubs in different sports. See
Midwest Communications, Inc. v. Minnesota Twins, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,719
(D. Minn. 1983) (discussed in Kagan, Pay TV Sports, Sept. 23, 1983, at 4-6). There the Min-
nesota Twins baseball franchise and Minnesota North Stars hockey franchise were enjoined under
the antitrust laws from marketing the "telecast rights for the games of one team on the condition
that the telecast tights for the other team be acquired in whole or in part." In a Memorandum
and Order entered March 30, 1984, the district court effectively dissolved the injunction, con-
cluding that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue under the antitrust laws.
136. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Okla. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
137. This was not the first lawsuit challenging the NCAA football telecasting patterns. In
Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 499 F. Supp.
537 (S.D. Ohio 1980), plaintiffs sought to enjoin ABC and the NCAA from denying Ohio State
games to a cable system serving Columbus, Ohio. Plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA contract
with ABC limiting pay-cable distribution violated the antitrust laws. The court refused to grant
a preliminary injunction since the plaintiffs had failed to show that they were without alternative
means of gaining access to college football games for pay-cable distribution. Plaintiff could-
and did-purchase all tickets to other local college games, giving itself the opportunity to cablecast
OSU games under the NCAA regulations. See Hochberg & Horowitz, Broadcasting and CA TV
The Beauty and the Bane of Major College Football, 38 LAw & CoNrmMP. PROBS. 112 (1973)
(the NCAA was "pooling at its peril").
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Georgia in substantial part because the NCAA had prohibited the schools
and other member institutions from selling games on their own to the net-
works or to the new media. The College Football Association (CFA)-of
which Oklahoma and Georgia are members-had sought to negotiate a televi-
sion package outside the NCAA contracts, believing that the property rights
belonged to individual institutions unless specifically relinquished by those
institutions. In response, the NCAA adopted the following "Official Inter-
pretation" of an NCAA by-law:
The Association shall control all forms of televising of the intercollegiate
football games of member institutions during the traditional football season
.... Any commitment by a member institution with respect to the televising
or cablecasting of its football games in future seasons necessarily would
be subject to the terms of the NCAA Football Television Plan applicable
to such season.' 3 '
According to the district court, this was the NCAA's "first clear statement"
that mere membership in the NCAA was a grant by the member to the NCAA
of the right to act as the school's agent for televising football. As the district
court also found, it was "NCAA's first specific statement that it controlled
'cablecasting' as well as broadcasting."' 3 9 The district court concluded that
while the NCAA "has a valid role to play in the regulation of college athletics,
it has gone far beyond the pale of this legitimate purpose in commandeering
the rights of its members to sell their games for television broadcast." ' The
district court, after a non-jury trial, held that the NCAA's Television Plan
and contracts were unlawful per se as price fixing and a group boycott, and
unlawful under a rule of reason analysis. The court further held that the NCAA
had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the intercollegiate
football market.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's per se price fixing and rule of reason
findings.' 4' The decision was predicated upon a number of factors. One im-
portant consideration, however, was that the NCAA restrictions are all-
138. 546 F. Supp. at 1285.
139. Id. at 1286.
140. Id. at 1309. The district court further characterized the NCAA actions as a "presump-
tuous seizure," id. at 1326, a "commandeering" of property rights, id. at 1307, 1309, 1317,
1326, and, potentially, a "lust for power" or "rank greed." Id. at 1328.
141. The court of appeals did not agree with the lower court's group boycott analysis. The
district court held that the NCAA members had illegally boycotted all broadcasters and cable
networks other than ABC, CBS and WTBS. The court of appeals, on the other hand, concluded:
The exclusivity features were used by the NCAA to extract the highest possible
prices from the networks. The opportunity to purchase the rights to the NCAA
football package was offered to all broadcasters. That certain networks were un-
successful bidders, or did not bid at all, does not turn the contracts into boycotts.
707 F.2d at 1160-61 (footnote omitted).
The court of appeals did not consider the monopolization ruling because the NCAA did not
urge a reversal of this ruling. Id. at 1159 n.16.
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embracing-that is, member institutions are not free to televise any of their
games other than through the NCAA. t42 This, of course, distinguishes the
NCAA arrangements from those of most of the professional sports leagues,
whose members enter into individual as well as league deals.
For purposes of the 1983 season, at least, the NCAA plan was allowed
to continue when Justice White issued a stay pending the Supreme Court's
decision on granting certiorari.'" 3 Justice White did raise some doubts as to
the correctness of the decisions below, and the Supreme Court subsequently
agreed to hear the case. The Tenth Circuit itself indicated that the antitrust
laws may not proscribe all NCAA regulations of its members institutions'
television rights. 4 " Thus, the extent to which there may be collegiate pooling
of rights consistent with the antitrust laws-by the NCAA or, for that mat-
ter, individual conferences-is not entirely clear at this time.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the NCAA litigation, the case illustrates
the substantial importance of the Sports Broadcast Act to the professional
sports leagues. The law spares the leagues of the uncertainty and expense of
litigating over whether their particular pooling arrangements are or can be
made consistent with the antitrust laws. ' 4 5
142. See id. at 1157. The court of appeals did note the NCAA "exception telecast" policy,
where schools could license telecasts that (1) are sold out or are being played more than
400 miles from an area in which the game is to be telecast and (2) will not be telecast within
a certain distance of other football games unless those games are sold out. But the court of
appeals concluded: "These telecasts occur infrequently and do not affect our analysis of the
television plan and network contracts." Id. at 1150 n.2.
143. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the U. of Okla., 104 S. Ct.
1 (1983).
144. Commenting on the breadth of the district court's injunction, the court of appeals noted:
[Plaragraphs one and four [of the injunction] appear to vest exclusive control of
television rights in the individual schools. While we hold that the NCAA cannot
lawfully maintain exclusive control of the rights, how far such rights may be com-
monly regulated involves speculation that should not be made on the record of
the instant case.
707 F.2d at 1162. The court of appeals, in fact, remanded the case to the district court to "con-
sider" the injunction in light of these views. Id. Query, however, whether it is that the NCAA
cannot maintain exclusive control or that the NCAA cannot maintain exclusive control.
145. One illustration of this point can be seen in an investigation of the NFL by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC was concerned about the manner in which the eight first-
round 1982-83 NFL playoff games had been scheduled for network broadcast. During the regular
season, NBC and CBS typically ran NFL broadcasts at the same time, and therefore, in direct
competition with each other. The scheduling, however, was changed for the January 8 and 9
playoff games. The four NFC playoff games were broadcast by CBS at 12:30-two on Saturday
and two on Sunday. The four AFC playoff games were broadcast by NBC at 4:00-two on
Saturday and two on Sunday. As a result, there was no head-to-head competition between the
networks-which meant, more significantly from the standpoint of sports fans (including those
at the FTC), that viewers could not switch between NFL games on different networks.
The FTC thought that the arrangement might be anticompetitive in that it diminished competi-
tion between the networks for the advertising dollars. However, at the conclusion of two days
of interviewing league and network officials, the FTC decided not to take any action. Apparent-
ly the decisive factor was that the NFL alone had made the scheduling decision. The FTC found
no evidence that the networks had pressured the NFL into this decision. The FTC thus con-
sidered the decision to be immune from challenge under the Sports Broadcast Act of 1961. See




Section 2 of the Sports Broadcast Act'4 6 excludes from the Act's immunity
any agreement which "prohibits any person to whom such [pooled] rights
are sold or transferred from televising any games within any area, except within
the home territory of a member club of the league on a day when such club
is playing a game at home." This provision was added at the recommenda-
tion of the Justice Department, which sought to codify Judge Grim's 1953
United States v. NFL decision limiting blackouts. 47 In that case, Judge Grim
upheld an NFL rule which prohibited each club from televising its games into
the home territories of other league members when those members were play-
ing at home. Judge Grim, however, held violative of the antitrust laws those
NFL rules which prohibited (1) the televising of a game into another team's
home territory when that team was televising its away game;' 4 and (2) the
radio broadcasting of a game into another team's home territory.' 49
Section 2 of the Act has been the subject of litigation, as well as the source
of further congressional action. In Blaich v. NFL' 0 a number of New York
Giants' fans sought a preliminary injunction against the blacking out of the
1962 NFL Championship game between the Giants and the Chicago Bears.
They argued that section 2 applies only to regular season games.'' The court
rejected this argument and denied the injunction, stating that section 2
expressly permits local area blackouts. It does not specify a pre-season
game, a season game, a post-season game or a championship game. It
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp. V 1982).
147. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). See H.R.
REP. No. 1178, supra note 131, at 5. This report also notes that: "The term 'home territory'
is not susceptible of a single definition that will be suitable for all professional football, baseball,
basketball and hockey leagues. By 'home territory' the committee means such home territory
as is recognized by a particular league's bylaws or custom and usage." Id.
148. Frequently overlooked is the fact that Congress in effect overruled this aspect of Judge
Grim's decision and of the 1961 Act. Allowing the NFL to pool its broadcast rights for sale
-to a single network had the practical effect of allowing the very blackouts which Judge Grim
had prohibited-a point which was made clear to Congress. As Commissioner Rozelle explained:
"If the purchasing network is required to carry Green Bay's away games back to Green Bay,
it cannot very well put in a New York Giants' game at the same time." Hearings on H.R. 8757
Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
31 (1961). Further, as stated by counsel for the NFL: "If you sell the television rights of the
National Football League to a single network, and you obligate that single network to carry
the games of each away team back to its home territory, it is quite obvious that the network
cannot carry any other game." Id. at 30.
149. It is important to note that Judge Grim's decision, which employs a rule-of-reason analysis,
was based upon the particular facts before the court. Thus, the 1953 decision leaves open the
possibility that a league could present adequate factual justification of any particular restraint
on broadcasting.
150. 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
151. In a manner that only a true sports fan (with limited knowledge of constitutional law)
can fully understand, plaintiffs also argued that the "deprivation of their right to observe [the
telecast] in common with the millions of Americans to whom it is being televised is a violation
of a basic human right, guaranteed by the Constitution and the law of the land." 212 F. Supp.
at 322. The district court had little sympathy for this argument, noting only that it is of "doubt-
ful validity." Id.
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uses the all-embracing term "game." In the face of such clear and une-
quivocal language there is no basis upon which this Court can reasonably
exclude from its authorization the area restriction of a league champion-
ship game.'
Following Blaich, several lawsuits were filed in efforts to enjoin NFL Super
Bowl blackouts, which presumably were made pursuant to section'2 of the
1961 Act. Although it won each of these cases,"5 3 the NFL did lift the local
blackout of the 1973 Super Bowl VII. The NFL's actions were taken largely
in response to mounting pressure from Congress to eliminate blackouts, par-
ticularly of sold-out games.'"
Congress, however, was not satisfied with simply the Super Bowl. In
September 1973, it enacted legislation which required the leagues to lift the
local blackout of any pooled telecast if all the tickets available for purclase
five days before the game were sold seventy-two hours or more in advance." 5
By its terms, the anti-blackout legislation expired on December 31, 1975. Never-
theless, the NFL voluntarily has continued to adhere to the terms of the
legislation.' 56 In 1978 the FCC determined that the effect of such compliance
is to reduce the NFL's revenues from lower gate revenues and concession
revenues by as much as $4.7 million per year' 57-a result which the FCC found
to be acceptable. The other professional sports leagues have relatively few
games that could have been subject to the anti-blackout legislation; generally,
however, these games have been televised.'5 8
152. Id.
153. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 595-96 (1977).
154. See generally, Hochberg, Second and Goal to Go: The Legislative Attack in the 92nd
Congress on Sports Broadcasting Practices, 18 N.Y.L. FORUM 841 (1973), 26 FED. CoM. B.J.
118 (1973); Hochberg, Congress Kicks a Field Goal: The Legislative Attack in the 93d Congress
on Sports Broadcasting Practices, 27 FED. COM. B.J. 27 (1974); SOBEL, supra note 153, at 596-606;
Hochberg, Law That Put Home Games Into the Home, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, § 5, at 2.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 331 (now expired). See generally Hearings on H.R. 9536 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blackout Hearings].
The bill almost emerged in a way that would have led to even more substantial problems among
the professional sports. By a 76-6 vote, the Senate had passed legislation requiring that any team
with a single game on television had to make available to TV any soldout game. S. 1841, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 28,729 (1973).
The House of Representatives, however, passed a much more limited bill. H.R. 9760, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 29,734 (1973). The bill applied only to packages sold to the
networks, and for all intents and purposes, applied only to the NFL, since baseball, basketball
and hockey sold very few games to the networks.
Professional hockey and basketball ended up expressing grudging support for the House ver-
sion because of their limited network contracts. Blackout Hearings, supra note 156, at 26, 40,
57, 130. It had become obvious to them that a steamroller had begun on the blackout issue;
it was better to change that steamroller's direction than attempt to stop it.
In conference, the House version was adopted and overwhelmingly approved by both bodies.
H.R. 9760, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 29,664-66 (1973). President Nixon signed it
on September 14, just in time for the opening of the 1973 season.
156. One piece of legislation introduced in the 98th Congress-H.R. 4104-would limit
the geographic areas of blackouts, preventing a game blacked out in Los Angeles, for instance,
from also being blacked out in San Diego.
157. FCC, THE EFFECT OF THE SPORTS ANTI-BLACKOUT LAW: FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1978).
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One additional case arising under section 2 of the 1961 Act was WTWV, Inc.
v. NFL,159 which involved the refusal of the NFL and Dolphins to permit
a Fort Pierce, Florida television station to broadcast Dolphins' home games
that had not been sold out. The station claimed that the refusal was not sanc-
tioned by section 2 because the station's transmitter was located more than
fifteen miles outside the Dolphins' seventy-five-mile home territory. Accord-
ing to the station, section 2 permitted the blackout of only those television
stations whose transmitters were located within the seventy-five-mile zone.
The district court rejected this argument, concluding that the location of
the transmitter was not decisive. The court held that the blackout of the sta-
tion was permissible under section 2 because the station broadcast with suffi-
cient power so that its telecasts were viewable well within the seventy-five-
mile zone. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding:
[T]he purpose of the statute is clear. The broadcast exemption from the
antitrust laws was intended to preserve the existence of the NFL by shielding
its member clubs from a decline in game attendance due to televising games
in the area from which spectators are drawn.... [77echnological advances
could undermine completely the purpose of § 1292 if the exemption is
applied only to restrictions on stations physically located within the 75-mile
radius that is designated home territory. Congressional purpose requires
that the antitrust exemption focus on where the potential ticket buyers
would receive the signal, not where it comes from. 6'
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's recognition that interpretation of the 1961 Sports
Broadcast Act must accommodate technological advances provides an
appropriate point upon which to conclude. Clearly, the communications in-
dustry is undergoing a dramatic revolution-a revolution in which the sports
interests have a substantial stake. As the stakes grow even higher, there will
be increased pressure for litigation, legislation and regulation affecting sports
broadcasting. In resolving the complex issues involved, it will be important
to place in proper perspective those fundamental legal principles which have
been developed during the more than four decades since a television camera
was trained on that 1939 Princeton-Columbia baseball game.
158. See id. at 90-92.
159. 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 145-46 (emphasis added).
There is another aspect of the Dolphins' litigation which also is significant. The district court
originally entered a preliminary injunction against the Dolphins, holding that the Sports Broad-
cast Act represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to private parties; the
district court focused upon the portion of the statute which permits the leagues themselves to
define their home territories. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed.
It concluded that a holding of unconstitutionality could not be made without further factual
findings by the district court. The Fort Pierce television station ultimately abandoned its con-
stitutional claim, and no further proceedings were held by the district court.
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